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Labor Redemption in Work Law
Andrew Elmore*

People with criminal records must find and keep work to reintegrateinto society. But
private employers often categorically exclude candidates with criminal record histories,
especially if the candidate is African American or Latinx. The conventionalwisdom is that
workplace laws offer little to address this problem. People with criminal records are not a
protected class under Title VII, and many employers fear that hiringpeople with criminal
records invites negligent hiring liability. Ban the Box privay laws delay but may not deter
overbroad criminalbackground checks.
This Article challenges this standardaccount by shiftingfocus to the state in imposing
arbitrary barriers to work. I expose a dignity interest in the removal of these unnecessary
barriers, or "labor redemption." I find foundations of labor redemption in successful
constitutional challenges to denials of public employment and occupational licenses. Labor
redemption is also, increasingly, a statutory right, in the automated sealing and expungement
of old and minor criminal records, and issuance of state certifications of individuals
as rehabilitated.
Reconceiving of these criminaljustice reforms as work law protections can resolve
structural limitations to Title VII and Ban the Box laws by providing evidence of
rehabilitation, andpermit courts to balance the redemption and security interests in negligent
hiring claims. Labor redemption also offers a law reform approach to facilitate reintegration
through work without imposing new legal obligations on private employers, or requiring an
extension of existing employment laws. This Article's assessment offers lessonsfor other areas
in which private decision makers exclude candidates because of state-imposed stigmas,
especially the close analogy of housing discrimination.

* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. The author is grateful to Anthony Alfieri,
Deborah Archer, Stephanie Bornstein, Zanita Fenton, Dallan Flake, Benjamin Heath, Elizabeth
Iglesias, Gillian Lester, Michael Pinard, Andres Sawicki, Catherine Sharkey, Joseph Steiner, and Noah
Zatz for their helpful discussions and invaluable comments; to the participants in the 2018 Colloquium
on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law, the AALS Emerging Voices in Workplace Law
program, and SEALS New Scholars' Program for thoughtful feedback; to Head of Reference Pam
Lucken; and to Kelsey Day, Andrew Denny, Aileen Graffe-McDonley, Diana Johnson and Samuel
Ludington, and student editors at the UC Irvine Law Review, for excellent research assistance. All errors
are the author's.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, and the
highest number and proportion of people with criminal records. There are over 100
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million arrest records,' nearly twenty million people in the United States with a
felony conviction, and an untold, but much larger number of people with
misdemeanor convictions. 2 Intensive, disparate policing and prosecution of African
American communities have racially skewed the proliferation of criminal records.
One-third of Black men have a felony conviction, and the United States incarcerates
Black women at a far higher rate than women of other races. 3
The successful reintegration of individuals into society after incarceration
requires people to find work after release. But work is elusive for people with a
criminal record. Even a nonviolent criminal record reduces the chances of an
employer interview or offer by about fifty percent.4 Two-thirds of people are jobless
a year after release from incarceration. 5
The conventional wisdom is that workplace laws have failed to keep pace with
the challenges of integrating people with criminal records in the workforce. This is
for good reason: there is no federal right to be free from discrimination because of
a criminal record.6 Claims that criminal record checks violate Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 suffer a number of structural limitations, the most important
of which is that the employer can often show that such checks are justified by
business necessity. 8 State and local "Ban the Box" laws, which prohibit criminal
record inquiries until the interview stage, delay but do not prohibit the exclusion of
people with criminal records from the workforce. Private employers may
legitimately fear that expanding opportunities for people with criminal records may
invite negligent hiring liability. Even worse, employers may react to these
protections by refusing to hire African Americans based on a stereotype that equates
race and criminality. These structural limitations and perverse incentives seem to

1. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014, at 2 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/bjs/grants/249799.pdf

[https://perma.cc/GUK9-U6EG].
2. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 41 (2018); see infra Section L.A
and note 20.
3. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ 251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 23 (2018) [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE], https://

www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/92DX-E8CZ].
4. See infra Section I.B.
5. See infra Section I.A.
6. See Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment DiscriminationAgainst
Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 47 (2015).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
has determined that criminal background checks have a disparate impact on African Americans and
Latinxs and violate Title VII unless consistent with business necessity. U.S. EQUAL
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION
OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE].
8.
See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cit. 2007); Tammy R. Pettinato,
Employment DiscriminationAgainst Ex-Offenders: The Promise and Limits of Title VII DisparateImpact
Theory, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 831, 842-64 (2014); Tammy R. Pettinato, Defying "Common Sense?": The
Legitimacy of Applying Title VII to Employer Criminal Records Policies, 14 NEv. L.J. 770 (2014).
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compel the conclusion that work law plays a marginal-or even
counterproductive-role in promoting reintegration.
The contribution of this Article is to show that people after incarceration have
a dignitary interest in freedom from arbitrary barriers to work that prevent
9
reintegration into society, or "labor redemption." This Article argues that, contrary
to the conventional view, labor redemption is immanent in constitutional, statutory,
and common law governing the workplace. Labor redemption is a recognized
dignitary interest in constitutional challenges to re-incarceration for failure to find
work, and overbroad exclusions from occupational licenses and public
employment. 10 The scholarship has largely ignored the vast array of policy tools
11
enacted since the 2007 Second Chance Act, which now entitle many people with
criminal records to the sealing and expungement of old and minor criminal records,
and certificates of relief to individuals whose criminal record history does not
suggest future risk. Longstanding federal and state policies encourage hiring through
tax credits, bonding and insurance. These second-chance reforms resolve structural
limitations to Title VII and Ban the Box laws by disrupting the stigma of criminal
records with evidence of rehabilitation and by shifting the costs of reintegration
away from employers, consumers, and co-workers. They also add nuance to
negligent hiring claims, permitting courts to balance labor redemption interests
against the consumer interest in public safety. 12
This Article, finally, offers labor redemption to guide work law reform in
prioritizing removal of state-imposed stigmas that unnecessarily interfere with

9. See infra Section IIA. Redemption is a criminology term, coined by Alfred Blumstein and
Kiminori Nakamura, leading scholars on desistance, who use the term to refer to the period after which
a person with a criminal conviction has no more risk of reoffending than the general public. See Alfred
Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Extension of Current Estimates of Redemption Times: Robustness
Testing, Out-of-State Arrests, and Racial Differences 8 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https:/
[https://perma.cc/4W3T-33J5]. "Redemption"
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240100.pdf
can be interpreted as a religious term, see J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal
Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133 HARV. L. REv. 2460, 2555 n.238 (2020), but I do not mean
redemption in this sense. I use the term redemption to mean a dignity interest in reintegration after
incarceration as a full member of the community. This Article's concept of labor redemption is
informed by the criminology scholarship ofJohn Braithwaite, the reentry scholarship of Michael Pinard,
and the moral philosophy of Jeremy Waldron. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND
REINTEGRATION 55 (1988) (cautioning that state-imposed stigmas can be criminogenic unless
eventually retired); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 457 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, CollateralConsequences] (proposing
a dignity-based approach to reentry); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43
ARIz. ST. L.J. 1107, 1119-20 (2011) (theorizing that individuals have a dignity interest in fulfilling
important state-assigned responsibilities without unnecessary interference by the state or third parties).
See infra Section III.A.
10.
11.
This assessment is aligned with calls to consider the state role in workplace protections. See
Samuel Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (arguing that the most
important barriers preventing the work of people with disabilities are work disincentives in social
welfare and insurance policies); Gillian Lester, A Defense of PaidFamiy Leave, 28 HARV.J.L. & GENDER
1, 9, 12-13 (2005) (assessing that state-funded family leave can be more effective than
employer-required leave mandates).
12.
See infra Section III.B-C.
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work.1 3 Expanding sealing and expungement, and other markers of rehabilitation,
will reduce employer aversions, permit Title VII plaintiffs to produce evidence of
rehabilitation, encourage a deliberative interview process in Ban the Box
jurisdictions, and establish a presumption of rehabilitation in negligent hiring claims.
While work is at the core of scholarship about reintegration into society after
incarceration,1 4 this Article is the first to connect labor redemption to plausible
litigation challenges to, and second-chance law reform measures limiting, arbitrary
state-imposed barriers and overbroad criminal background checks.1 5 The Article
also contributes to employment law scholarship by demonstrating how
second-chance reforms have reshaped employment law protections without
imposing legal obligations on private employers or requiring an extension of
employment laws. Redemption as a conceptual framework has important
implications beyond work law, especially for housing discrimination,1 6 and for other
civil disabilities that may suggest future risk to employers, including credit history
problems, past unemployment history or eviction, or receipt of public assistance.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with the staggering costs of
mass incarceration and its reach into the lives of individuals, who are
disproportionately African American and Latinx, and who must find work, either
as an express term of supervised release or in order to reintegrate into society. It
will then illuminate the ways that state-imposed stigmas impose arbitrary, impassible
barriers to work. Part II will introduce reintegration through work, or "labor
redemption," as a dignity interest, and will show how second chance initiatives
provide legal entitlement to and incentives for labor redemption. Part III will
demonstrate how existing employment laws protect labor redemption, particularly
after second-chance reforms. Labor redemption permits a due process challenge to
re-incarceration for failure to find work, and state denials of public employment
and occupational licenses. Even better, second-chance reforms are a conceptual tool
to resolve structural limitations in Title VII and Ban the Box laws, and enable courts
to balance competing redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims.
Part IV offers labor redemption to guide future law reform. It argues, specifically,

See infra Section IV.
See Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1349-50 (2017). The
scholarship primarily discusses redemption in the context of clemency. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark
Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Planfor Renewal, 82 U. ClHI. L. REV. 1,
3 (2015); ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY,
RACE, AND POLITICs (2008). Benjamin Levin examines the impact of private employers in becoming
"critical players in the contemporary criminal system," both as source of exclusion and support.
Benjamin Levin, CriminalEmployment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 2268 (2018).
Michael Pinard has previously critiqued the impact of a conviction on dignity interests and
15.
13.

14.

argued in favor of expanding expungement and sealing measures to protect them. See Michael Pinard,
Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 963, 989-96 (2013); Pinard,
CollateralConsequences, supra note 9. This Article expands on these themes by identifying constitutional,
statutory, and tort doctrines that recognize a dignitary interest in redemption and by showing how
second-chance reforms strengthen them.
See infra Section IV.C.
16.

UC IRVINE LA W REVIEW

292

[Vol. 11:287

that easing the availability of sealing and expungement and other markers of
rehabilitation is a more plausible and effective pathway to facilitate successful
reintegration through work than amending existing work law. Through an
examination of the close analogy of housing discrimination, it demonstrates how its
call to turn to the state role in imposing arbitrary barriers has implications beyond
work law. The Article concludes that labor redemption offers a partial solution to
the barriers that prevent successful reintegration through work, without expanding
private employer legal obligations or requiring new employment laws.
I. LABOR REDEMPTION AS PRECONDITION FOR REINTEGRATION

Most individuals must work to successfully reintegrate into society after
incarceration. After release from incarceration, the state requires individuals to
acquire and maintain work as a term of post-incarceration supervision, and to pay
17
court-ordered fines and penalties, under threat of re-incarceration. Behind these
formal state mandates for work lies a broad assignment of the responsibility to find
work as a central goal of reintegration into society. Reintegration requires the
individual to find secure housing and health care, reconnect with family, and
develop positive social networks, all of which can be contingent on a steady,
meaningful job.
After briefly describing the centrality of work for reintegration, this Part will
explore how state-imposed stigmas and barriers to work, especially the creation of
a permanent, publicly accessible criminal record and occupational restrictions, can
undermine reintegration.
A. The Centrality of Work for Reintegration
There is a well-developed body of scholarship about mass incarceration,
18
especially its growth and impact on African Americans and the poor. The shadow
of the carceral state extends well beyond the 2.2 million incarcerated people in the
20
United States' 9 to include the additional 4.5 million adults on parole and probation
and the 19 million people, or eight percent of the adult population, in the United

Noah D. Zatz, Get to Work or Go to Jail. State Violence and the Racialized Production of
17.
Precarious Work, 45 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 304, 317-19 (2020).
See, e.g.,JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
18.
AMERICA (2017); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS,
CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE,
CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007); BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUAITY IN AMERICA (2006).
See John Gramlich, America's Incarceration Rate Is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW
19.
RSCH. CTR. (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas[https://perma.cc/Z89V-P4EN]. This includes "1.5
incarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/
million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 741,000 in the custody of locally
run jails." Id
See PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 3, at 1.
20.
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States today with a felony conviction. 2 1 Even this fails to capture the 100 million
people with arrest records and the explosion of misdemeanor prosecutions,
estimated to be between 10 and 13 million per year. 22
The criminal justice system is steeped in racial bias against and stigmatization
of African Americans, from racial bias in police stops and arrests, 23 to racially
disproportionate prosecutions and sentencing of African Americans. 24 As a result,
"approximately one-third of the African American adult male population" has a
felony conviction. 25
Nearly all incarcerated individuals are eventually released, 26 just as most
individuals placed on probation and parole successfully complete their
supervision. 27 The successful reintegration of these released individuals into society
is a high priority for the United States. In 2004, George W. Bush declared in his
State of the Union Address that "America is the land of the second chance, and
28
when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life." In
29
2007, the United States enacted the Second Chance Act, authorizing grants to
support comprehensive reentry programming. Barack Obama in 2011 established
the Federal Interagency Reentry Council, coordinating twenty federal agencies to

21.
Sarah K. S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and SpacialDistributionof People with Felony Records
in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806, 1814 (2017).
22.
Alexandra Natapoff estimates that there are thirteen million misdemeanor case filings per
year. NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 41.
23.
See id. at 10 (summarizing studies showing that, e.g., "Chicago police arrest African
Americans for marijuana possession seven times more often than they arrest whites, even though whites
and Blacks use marijuana at the same rates"); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558-59
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing evidence that stop-and-frisk practices in New York City stopped African
Americans over five times as often as whites, despite the fact that police found weapons and contraband
in a greater proportion of stopped whites).
24. African American men are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white males.
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 8 tbl.8 (2012). One
in three African American men in their twenties are "either in prison or jail, on probation, or on parole."
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarcerationin African American Communities,
56 STAN. L. REv. 1271, 1274 (2004). In many cities, including Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, more
than half of young African American men are under criminal supervision. Id. Black women are
incarcerated at twice the rate of Latinas and over three times the rate of white women. Id.
25.
Shannon et al., supra note 21, at 12.
See Reentry Trends in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/content/
26.
reentry/reentry.cfm [https://perma.cc/8FQU-6NKX] (Nov. 2, 2020).
27.
About fifteen percent of individuals on parole and probation are incarcerated per year.
SUSAN K. URAHN & MICHAEL THOMPSON, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PROBATION AND PAROLE
SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIG H STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 1-2 (2018) ("Each year almost 350,000
of those [2.3 million] individuals [who exit probation or parole] return to jail or prison, often because
of rule violations rather than new crimes.").
28. Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archive/
fbci/progmenu-reentry.html [https://perma.cc/FAH5-M6ZL] (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
29. 42 U.S.C. §5 10631-10632.

UC IRVINE LA W REVIEW

294

[Vol. 11:287

improve reentry outcomes, 30 and Donald Trump in 2018 reauthorized both the
31
Second Chance Act and reconvened the Reentry Council.
The United States primarily addresses the reintegration of individuals after
incarceration into society by affording them with conditional benefits while
32
subjecting them to punitive restrictions. Reducing recidivism through work is a
central goal of reentry policy. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that of the
650,000 people annually released from prison, "two-thirds will likely be rearrested
within three years of release." 33 Criminologists have found that stable, meaningful
34
work is a powerful predictor of desistance, and for over a decade, the United States
has adopted an official position in favor of employment after incarceration to
encourage rehabilitation.35
Meaningful, steady work can also improve the emotional and material welfare
of individuals after release. One longitudinal study of individuals in their first year
after release from prison reports that "regular skilled work [is] a source of structure
and pride, capable of repudiating the stigma of incarceration and making one's
36
livelihood a positive source of identity, not just the basis of material well-being."
Even a low-wage job can provide previously incarcerated individuals with material
and emotional stability, health insurance, a productive routine, and a social role
associated with maturation and desistance. 37
But reentry work requirements are intended to do more than improve the
welfare of people after incarceration. They are also a debt to fulfill, backed by the
38
threat of reincarceration for failure to work. As Noah Zatz, Tia Koonse, Theresa

CTR., http://
RES.
Council, NAT'L REENTRY
30. Federal Interagency Reentry
visited
(last
[https://perma.cc/4XHN-2FXM]
csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/firc/
Sept. 23, 2020).
President Trump Signs FirstStep Act into Law, Reauthorizing Second Chance Act, COUNCIL
31.
OF ST. GOv'TS JUSTICE CTR. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://csgjusticecenter.org/jc/president-trump-signsfirst-step-act-into-law-reauthorizing-second-chance-act/ [https://perma.cc/N7EY-JG4A].
Reuben Jonathan Miller & Forrest Stuart, Carceral Citizenship: Race, Rights and
32.
Responsibility in the Age of Mass Supervision, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 532 (2017). State reentry
programs often condition benefits, including subsidized housing, job assistance, and drug treatment
programs, on payment of fees and fines and compliance with various restrictions, including work
requirements. Id. at 541-43.
33.
Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, supra note 28.
ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KMITNORI NAKAMURA, REDEMPTION FOR REINTEGRATING
34.
PRISONERS IN THE ERA OF WIDESPREAD BACKGROUND CHECKS 10 (2014).
35. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, "[a]ssisting ex-prisoners in finding and
keeping employment," is a "key element[] . . . of successful re-entry into our community." Prisonersand
PrisonerRe-Entry, supra note 28, at 1.
36. BRUCE WESTERN, HOMEWARD: LIFE IN THE YEAR AFTER PRISON 84 (2018).

37.

Id at 87-90.

38. According to Susila Gurusami's ethnography of work required of formerly incarcerated
Black women, "the state demands [B]lack women exchange their carceral histories for redemptive
employment to demonstrate their commitment to criminal rehabilitation." Susila Gurusami, Working
for Redemption: Formerly IncarceratedBlack Women and Punishment in the Labor Market, 31 GENDER
& SOC'Y 433, 450 (2017). Rehabilitation work is "payment for their carceral histories beyond the time
their prison sentences end, specifically through their employment." Id.
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Zhen, Lucero Herrera, Han Lu, Steven Shafer, and Blake Valenta explain, the nearly
five million people released on parole and probation must pursue and maintain
employment, and may be incarcerated "for refusing certain kinds of work, for
quitting, and even for being fired." 39 Work is also necessary for people on probation
and parole to pay state-ordered debt. The United States incarcerates hundreds of
thousands of people on probation and parole per year for failing to repay on time. 40
The logic of carceral citizenship, then, requires sufficiently remunerative work as a
continuing expression of rehabilitation in order for the individual to
receive redemption.

B. Barriers to Labor Redemption Undermine Reintegration
The state requirement that individuals after release find work often ignores
the individuals' limited employment prospects, the employer's aversion to hiring
people with criminal records, and the state's role in foreclosing meaningful
employment opportunities. People with criminal record histories have poor
employment outcomes 41 for many reasons, beginning with a bleak labor market at
the bottom of the income scale. 42 Most incarcerated individuals lack a high school
degree, and many struggle with drug addiction, physical disabilities, and mental
illness.43 Many individuals with criminal records lack sufficient education to qualify
for meaningful, stable jobs.44 The disproportionate number of people who have
been previously incarcerated and who are African American and Latinx must also
45
contend with race discrimination by employers.

39. NOAH ZATZ, TIA KOONSE, THERESA ZHEN, LUCERO HERRERA, HAN LU, STEVEN
SHAFER & BLAKE VALENTA, GET TO WORK OR Go TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT
5 (2016) (reporting that every day "about 9,000 people are incarcerated for violating a probation or
parole requirement to hold a job").
40. Two-thirds of people incarcerated for failure to pay state fines and fees "reported full-time
work in the month before incarceration-but mostly with earnings below $1,000 per month." Id
Professor Gurusami similarly found that the state mandate for "full-time work with health benefits"
can lead parole and probation officers to threaten supervised individuals with reincarceration for taking
"temporary, contract-based, or otherwise .. . insecure or precarious work." Gurusami, supra note 38,
at 443.
41.
Most people leaving jail or prison have no job, and sixty to seventy percent of formerly
incarcerated people are unemployed a year after their release. SeeJOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003). Professor Western, controlling for other
factors, found that "[m]en with prison records are estimated to earn 30 to 40 percent less each year."
WESTERN, supra note 18, at 120.
LAWRENCE MISHEL,JARED BERNSTEIN & HElDI SHIERHOLZ, THE STATE OF WORKING
42.
AMERICA 2008/2009, at 16-22, 76-94 (2012).
WESTERN, supra note 36, at 83.
43.
Most people who have been incarcerated lack a high school degree, "score low on cognitive
44.
tests," and return to neighborhoods with little opportunity for less-skilled individuals. WESTERN, supra
note 18, at 110.
45.
See PAGER, supra note 18, at 86-99. Professor Western found that those individuals who
found steady, well-paying work were primarily white, older men with connections to unions in the
skilled trades. African American men fared among the most poorly in the study, despite their relative
youth and good health. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 90-94, 98-99. According to Professor Gurusami,
her study showed the interplay of class, gender, and race in the reentry goals of parole and probation
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But, separate from these barriers, the carceral state uniquely restricts
employment opportunities, both indirectly and directly. Incarceration erodes social
networks often necessary for referral and hiring, and requires behavioral adaptations
ill-suited for work.46 As a result, while people previously incarcerated can find
precarious work in the cash economy, "they are short on the trust, skills, and social
47
contacts that open doors to primary sector jobs."
The carceral state also imposes collateral consequences that sharply restrict
8
The government imposes myriad collateral
employment opportunity. 4
consequences on individuals with criminal records, including "over 48,000 laws,
regulations and administrative penalties that constrain the mobility of people with
criminal records." 49 About three-fourths of collateral consequences are employment
related,50 and many of these restrict occupational licenses and disqualify private
5
sector employers from hiring people who have a criminal record. 1 Most of these
restrictions apply notwithstanding the severity of the conviction or how long ago

it occurred.

52

The state also directly restricts employment opportunity by creating and
disseminating publicly accessible records that employers assume is a signal of the
individual's future risk. Criminal record histories are examples of what Devah Pager
has called negative credentials, or "official markers that restrict access and
53
opportunity rather than enabling them." Criminal records trigger "social stigma
54
and generalized assumptions of untrustworthiness or undesirability." Applicants
with a marker of risk are often greeted with distrust, rooted in a fear that these

officers and nonprofit caseworkers, who channeled poor, Black women away from jobs they deemed
dangerous or immoral, and those requiring additional education, and into the female-dominated field
of social services. Gurusami, supra note 38, at 443-51.
46. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 113, 122-23.
47. Id. at 122.
48. As Michael Pinard explains, "the United States has a uniquely extensive and debilitating web
of collateral consequences that continue to punish and stigmatize individuals with criminal records long
after the completion of their sentences. These consequences stifle reintegration by making it difficult,
if not impossible, for individuals to move past their criminal records and for families to reunite and
thrive." Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 524.
49. Miller & Stuart, supra note 32, at 534. This includes ineligibility for welfare and public
housing and disqualification from voting, juries, and many types of private- and public-sector
employment. For a description of these collateral consequences, see JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL
CRIMINAL RECORD 246-69 (2015).
50. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Extending "Dignity Takings": Re-Conceptualizing the Damage Caused
by Criminal History and Ex-Offender Status, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863, 882 (2018) (including
employment, business license, government contracting, occupational and professional license, and
certification restrictions).
51. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 262-63.
52. Relatively few people who have been incarcerated have been convicted of homicide or rape.
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40 ("Homicide and rape-the most serious state crimes-comprise less
than 4 percent of felonies.").
53. PAGER, supra note 18, at 32.
54. Id. at 33.

2020]

LABOR REDEMPTIONIN WORK LAW

297

candidates will harm others in the workplace. 55 Criminal records can also trigger
"confirmation bias" in conjunction with race, confirming negative stereotypes that
associate African American men with risk. 56
Employers almost always consider an applicant's criminal record before
making a hiring decision. 57 The ubiquity of background checks are driven by the
digital, public availability of criminal records. Federal, state, and local agencies
collect criminal records and provide them to private credit reporting agencies, which
integrate them into digital hiring processes for employers. 58
The integration of big data in hiring has accelerated this trend and made it
difficult to circumvent. 59 Gaps in resumes often cannot be easily explained, and
with the rise of algorithmic hiring, data mining permits employers to use proxies for
60
hidden variables, such as criminal records, when they are difficult to find.
A criminal record is a powerful stigma for employers. Most employers report
that they would not hire an applicant with a criminal record. 6 1 Many field
experiments conclude that employers are far less likely to offer an interview or job
62
to a person who discloses a criminal record, especially if the applicant is Black.
Employers have an inflated sense of the risk of a candidate with a criminal record

55. While people with recent criminal record histories are at a higher risk of offending than
people with no criminal record history, the risk differential diminishes rapidly over time. Megan
C. Kurlycheck, Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old
Criminal Record PredictFuture Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL'Y 583, 498-500 (2006).
56. PAGER, supra note 18, at 71.
57. One report found that ninety-six percent of surveyed employers indicate that they use one
or more type of employment background screening. HR.COM, VIEW OF HUMAN RESOURCES
PROFESSIONALS ON BACKGROUND SCREENING METHODS AND EFFECTIVENESS (2017), http://
www.napbs.com/NAPBS/assets/File/NAPBSSurvey.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8E2-83NH].
58. See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 32-90.
59. Id. at 88-90.
60. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857,
874-83 (2017).
61. See Naomi F. Sugie, Noah D. Zatz & Dallas Augustine, Employer Aversion to Criminal
Records: An ExperimentalStudy of Mechanisms, 58 CRIMINOLOGY 5, 5 (2019); Harry J. Holzer, Steven
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 (2006) (finding that over sixty percent of employers
express an aversion to hiring people with criminal records).
The most comprehensive of these experiments, by Devah Pager, found that the disclosure
62.
of a criminal record reduces the likelihood of an employer callback by one-half to two-thirds. She
additionally found that Black testers who disclose a criminal record are far less likely to be considered
than comparable white testers reporting the same criminal record. PAGER, supra note 18, at 71; see also
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination:A Field
Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191 (2018) (finding that when employers asked about criminal history,
those reporting no history received nearly two-thirds more callbacks than applicants who reported a
criminal record); Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of CriminalRecords on Access to Employment,
107 AM. ECON. REv. 560, 560-64 (2017) (finding that "employers were 60 percent more likely to call
back applicants" that do not have a felony conviction); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The
Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as CollateralConsequence Relief Mechanisms: An ExperimentalStudy,
35 YALE L. & POL.'Y REV. INTER ALIA 11, 19 (2016) (reporting that fewer than ten percent of applicants
reporting a minor criminal record, but nearly thirty percent of applicants reporting no criminal record,
received an offer or interview appointment).
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compared with other signals of undesirable behavior. The aversion appears, instead,
to be status linked, a cognitive bias that channels people with criminal records,
especially racial minorities, into "bad" jobs associated with low social status
regardless of qualifications or actual risk.63
Criminologists have expressed alarm that the growing and permanent stigma
of a criminal record has disrupted the "traditional models of shaming, reintegration,
and desistance from crime." 64 Restorative justice proponents argue that
state-imposed stigmas must be eased over time to avoid "the criminogenic
consequences of assignment to a deviant master status," in which people with a
65
criminal record are marked as outcasts who are beyond redemption. For many
criminologists, "stigma erosion" is essential for individuals to "transition away from
social identities and roles as deviants into upstanding citizens," through meaningful,
well-paid work. 66 Simone Ispa-Landa and Charles Loeffler, summarizing their study
of individuals after release, cast doubt on whether this transition is possible because
the ongoing stigma of a criminal record makes "a stable job in the formal economy
... a desirable but elusive goal." 67 Extending labeling theory to the digital footprint
of a criminal record, Sarah Lageson and Shadd Maruna theorize that the Internet
has become a "digital prison" for people with a criminal record, which "could
artificially extend criminal involvements by leading the person to a sense of
68
hopelessness or defiance (the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy)." Whether or not
a permanent, publicly available criminal record becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy
as labeling theory suggests, 69 there is little doubt that it is criminogenic, in disrupting
70
the role of meaningful work in fostering desistance.

Sugie et al., supra note 61, at 19-20, 24.
Sarah Lageson & Shadd Maruna, Digital Degradation: Stigma Management in the Internet
Age, 20 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 113, 115 (2018).
65. BRAITH WAITE, supra note 9, at 54-55.
66. Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal
Record: Stigma Reports Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387, 388-89 (2016).
Id. at 399. While interview subjects all expressed a desire for jobs that offered regular hours
67.
and benefits, many reported that when they sought formal employment, they failed employer
background checks, even when the charge was dismissed or if the previous conviction was over a decade
63.
64.

old. Id. at 398-401.
Lageson & Maruna, supra note 64, at 126 (explaining that labeling theory predicts that
68.
mugshots, arrest records, and criminal dispositions, after being widely shared, searched, and linked to
other biographical information on the internet, can become a "sticky," criminogenic label).
Whether a criminal sanction deters or causes crime has been the subject of scholarly debate
69.
since the 1970s. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2521 & n.251. Some labeling theorists have
proposed that the stigma of labeling people as criminals is self-fulfilling, causing internalization of a
criminal identity as a way of life. Professor Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming, while accepting
that stigmatizing forms of shaming can be criminogenic, argues that shaming can deter criminal conduct
and promote reintegration if it is applied while maintaining bonds of respect, directed at the conduct
and in the
supra note
70.
to quality

context of societal approval of the person, and terminated with forgiveness. BRAITHWAITE,
9, at 100-01.
As Professors Prescott and Starr explain, "[t]o the extent that criminal records limit access
housing, student loans, satisfying employment, and decent wages, [removing the stigma of
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II. DIGNITY, REDEMPTION, AND WORK
The previous Part reconceptualized work as a responsibility assigned by the
state to individuals with criminal records to reintegrate into society. It also identified
the state as a source of barriers to work that sharply limit employment opportunity,
especially for African Americans, Latinxs, and the poor. This Part will introduce
labor redemption as a dignity interest in removal of unnecessary state-imposed
barriers that interfere with the responsibility to find and keep work. Increasingly,
the state has recognized this interest in "second chance" legislation, which permits
individuals to seal or expunge old or minor records and provides markers of
rehabilitation to the previously incarcerated. These reforms, alongside longstanding
financial incentives to encourage hiring, have elevated labor redemption to an
important right in work law, as explained in the next Part.
A. Labor Redemption as a Dignitary Interest
Labor redemption is rooted in dignity, a foundational idea in human rights
discourse. 71 While dignity has old roots, 72 dignity as an individual right to respect
and duty to respect others7 3 is reflected in the Enlightenment revolution in the
United States. Thomas Paine called for recognition of the "natural dignity of man"
as a status for all people, 74 a concept of dignity also expressed in the FederalistPapers
by Alexander Hamilton and in the correspondence of Thomas Jefferson. 75 In this
modern version of dignity, as explained by Ronald Dworkin, dignity requires
recognition that treating people as less than a "full member of the human
community" is both unjust and a denial of "political equality." 76 According to
Jeremy Waldron, this more egalitarian version of dignity did not displace its

criminal records] should reduce recidivism by mitigating each of these socioeconomic contributors to
criminal behavior." Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2521.
71. MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012); Arthur Chaskalson,
Human Dignity as a ConstitutionalValue, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE 133, 134 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
72. Plato describes dignity as a reference to a person's rank (adopted by the Romans), and early
Christian theologians invoked dignity to distinguish humans from animals. Joern Eckert, Legal Roots of
Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS
DISCOURSE 41, 43 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
73. This expression of dignity is most associated with Immanuel Kant, who wrote that human
dignity is expressed in the human capacity for "moral autonomy and individuality." Id at 46.
74. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 55 (1791).
75.
Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 1, 5-6 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); William A. Parent,
Constitutional Values and Human Digniy, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND
AMERICAN VALUES 47, 69-70 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (quoting Hamilton
in the Federalist Papers exhorting the adoption of the Constitution "for your liberty, your dignity, and
your happiness").
76. RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198-99 (1977).
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77
traditional association with a person's role in society. Instead, "[h]igh rank was
78
In this formulation, "the
generalized rather than being simply repudiated."
modern notion of human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that
we now try to accord to every human being something of the dignity, rank, and
79
expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility."
While dignity is an undervalued interest in the United States as compared to
Europe, 80 it is constitutionally recognized. Dignity is protected in the First
Amendment, which prohibits regulation of hateful speech, yet permits libel and

defamation actions "to protect the dignity and reputation of the persons themselves,
81
not to impose an aura of untouchability around their convictions." The Thirteenth
Amendment expresses a protection of the dignity interests of African Americans to
be free from slavery. 82 Chief Justice Warren invoked Paine's words in announcing
in Trop v. Dulles83 that "[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
84
nothing less than the dignity of man." Dignity is a substantive due process right
86
85
in the privacy cases of Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices,
87
and especially in Obergefell v. Hodges, which insists that the right to marriage is
88
fundamental to plaintiffs' "equal dignity."
Redemption, or the restoration of legal rights and removal of state-imposed
stigmas, is reflected in the United States in bankruptcy law to forgive financial
debts 89 and in criminal law, for juveniles and through executive clemency. While the

77. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13-27, 34-36 (2012); Waldron, supra
note 9, at 1118-19. Kant described the dignity of an individual in pre-modern society as a function of
the rank of the individual, whether a duke, ambassador, judge, or bishop. Id. at 1119.
78. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1119.
79. Id. at 1120 (emphasis omitted).
80. Pinard, CollateralConsequences, supra note 9, at 519.
81. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1613
(2010); Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1201 (2011).
82. Parent, supra note 75, at 69.

83.
84.

356 U.S. 86 (1958).
Id at 100.

429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (finding a substantive due process privacy "interest in
85.
avoiding disclosure of personal matters").
433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); f NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without
86.
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon, but
holding that interest is outweighed by government's interest as an employer and statutory privacy
protections satisfy this privacy right).
576 U.S. 644 (2015). Kenji Yoshino argues that the right to marry is a responsibility-right.
87.
KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK Now: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 97 (2015).
88. Id. at 681 ("They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them
that right."); see Laurence H. Tribe, EqualDignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARv. L. REV. F. 16, 27-32
(2015) (arguing that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion engaged in the "creative intertwining of the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses into a principle of equal dignity"); Kenji Yoshino, A New
Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 162-63, 169 (2015) (charting the right
to equal dignity in Obergefell as a "substantive due process" right that "is not reducible to any formula,
but is left instead to a common law methodology").
89.
Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Jangcr, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in
Chapter 11, 96 TEx. L. REV. 673, 731 (2018).
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United States does not guarantee a general right to redemption in criminal law, the
Eighth Amendment protection of juvenile offenders includes a right "to be
forgiven." 90 This precludes the death penalty for juvenile offenders and requires
individualized sentencing that takes account of the prospects for redemption,
sharply limiting life sentences for juveniles. 9 1 Some states have extended this right
by banning the sentence of life without parole for juveniles. 92 The U.S. Constitution
also recognizes the executive power of clemency as a tool of corrective justice and
to mitigate the undue severity of criminal sentences.9 3
Individuals with a criminal record have a significant dignity interest in labor
redemption, or the disruption of state-imposed barriers that unnecessarily interfere
with the individual's right to find and keep work after a criminal conviction.
Criminal record history is a permanent status of inferiority, not unlike the ancient
notion of dignity as rank. This inferior status interferes with its bearer's ability to
obtain material support and to gain acceptance and reintegration in the community
after the sentence is complete. This interest justifies disruption of the stigma of a
criminal record, particularly when the state requires work, and after the point at
which the individual's criminal record history does not suggest a significantly greater
risk of future criminal activity than the general public.
Labor redemption as a conceptual framework draws from the moral
philosophy of Jeremy Waldron, especially his theory of responsibility-rights, and
Michael Pinard's human rights, dignity-based approach to reintegration. For
Professor Waldron, some responsibilities have a "dual character" of rights, or
responsibility-rights. 94 Jury service, for example, is a responsibility required by the
Seventh Amendment, in order to restrict judges with popular sovereignty, and
compelled by threat of legal sanction. 95 Jury service is also a right, entrusting
ordinary individuals with legal decisionmaking in civil and criminal matters and is a
measure of equal citizenship, as shown by successful campaigns by women for
inclusion in jury service.96 Parents, too, have a legal obligation to care for their

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005).
90.
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see also Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 464
91.
(Fla. 2016) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471) (explaining that Roper and Miller require sentencing courts
to provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a juvenile's
"diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform" when aggregate sentences are the functional
equivalent of life without parole); Katherine Hunt Federle, Exploring the Parameters of a Child's Right
to Redemption: Some Thoughts, 68 S.C. L. REV. 487, 489-91 (2017).
92.
See, e.g., State v. Bassett, 394 P.3d 430, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017), afd, 428 P.3d 343
(Wash. 2018) (finding that statute permitting juvenile sentence of "a life without parole or early release
sentence is unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of our state constitution").
93. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEx. L. REv. 561,

572-88 (2001).
94. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1116.
95. Robert P. Burns, The Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities of the Jury: On the Structure of
Normative Argument, 43 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2011).
96. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1124-25.
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97
children. But parenting "is not just a matter of submitting to a set of rules." A
parent must engage in "continual and active exercise of intelligence and choice; and
these are her choices to make, her intelligence to exercise. She is privileged," to
98
make these choices, subject to limits imposed by the state. There is also an
99
"outward-looking aspect" to this right. If a bystander disciplines another parent's
unruly child, the parent's objection that discipline is her responsibility "is something
like a right that she holds, but it is a right that is kind of synonymous with

a responsibility."' 00
For Professor Waldron, jury service and parenting show the "dual character
of right and responsibility." A responsibility-right entails state "designation of an
important task," which is assigned to someone with a particular interest in it, and
"the protection of their decision-making pursuant to this responsibility against
interference by others and even by the state (except in extreme cases)."101
Finding and keeping work after incarceration as a condition of release or in
order to pay fines and penalties is a similar sort of responsibility. Release from
incarceration is an upward equalization of rank, affording to the individual, after
release, conditions that are denied in prison and jail. This includes the right, when
employed after incarceration, to work in conditions that do not violate the
02
Thirteenth Amendment-which expressly exempts prisoners1 -as well as other
103
This
employment rights that courts often find inapplicable to prison laborers.
transformation fits naturally with "the idea of role-based dignity and the idea of
responsibility rights .... "104 The ability to find and keep work is itself an important
right, as shown by the state requirement that individuals after incarceration obtain
work as a condition of supervised release. Like jury service, the state entrusts the
individual to select a range of work, but with state supervision to ensure that it
comports with the requirements of supervised release. Finding and keeping work is
also important for the individual as a means of material support and community
reintegration, and for society as a marker of desistance. Given its importance and
the state requirement to find and keep work as a condition of release, it is perverse
for the state to simultaneously impose stigmas that unnecessarily reduce the capacity
of individuals to find work.1 05 The role of the state in both requiring and prohibiting

97. Id. at 1115-56 (discussing a parental legal right and responsibility to care for one's children,
and the legal right and responsibility to serve on a jury).

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1116.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1 ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
102.
punishmentfor crime whereof the party shall have been duy convicted, shall exist within the United States,
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.") (emphasis added).
See generaly Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the
103.
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REv. 857, 870 (2008).
Waldron, supra note 9, at 1121.
104.
As Ben Laurence explains, there is a connection between responsibility-rights and capacity
105.
because assigning responsibilities to individuals who lack the capacity to perform them faces "a
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work as a condition of release justifies a correlative right to be free from arbitrary
state-imposed barriers to work.
A human rights model of dignity also justifies the removal of state-imposed
barriers that unnecessarily interfere with the individual's ability to find and keep
work after release from incarceration. Even after work is no longer a state
requirement, it often remains essential for survival and community reintegration.
Individuals with old or irrelevant criminal records maintain a dignity interest in relief
from the stigma of these convictions in order to restore their dignity and reintegrate
into the community. As Michael Pinard explains, in a human rights model, dignity
is "the starting point for interpretation" of rights, instead of "an end point" rooted
in a specific constitutional protection. 106 It would seek to elevate the status of
people after leaving incarceration "as much as possible, to their prior status, rather
107
than impose broad legal restrictions that serve to degrade and marginalize them."
As Professor Pinard argues, a dignity-based approach would remove collateral
consequences that are not proportionate to the offense and that deepen racial
disparities, and would also provide for mechanisms for relief to disrupt their lifetime
stigma.1 08 While Professor Pinard identifies this dignity-based approach in other
countries, 109 as I will demonstrate in the next Section, recent second-chance reforms
are an important step toward labor redemption as a right in the United States.
In making the claim that there is a dignity interest in labor redemption, I do
not contend that this dignity interest trumps all other interests or that weighing this
interest against others poses no risks. Dignity interests can conflict with liberty and
equality interests110 and can be balanced against these other values. Balancing these
interests risks minimizing one or more of them, and private employers and courts
are often ill suited for the task. Even worse, as some human rights scholars insist,
dignity claims can conflate a humanist dignity principle with an older, status-based
111
This
understanding of dignity as consonant with one's rank in society.
to
and
courts
private
employers
lead
can
of
dignity
understanding
status-based

powerful prima facie objection on the grounds of its apparent perversity." Ben Laurence, The
Responsibility-Formof Rsghts and PracticalCapacities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1223, 1224-25 (2011)
Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 521.
106.
107. Id. at 526-27.
108.
Id. at 524-33.
Professor Pinard locates this model in the conception of dignity rights of Canada, South
109.
Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, which have struck down disenfranchisement policies
on dignity grounds. Id. at 464, 521.
110.
As Martha Minow cautions, promoting legal forgiveness "may jeopardize the predictability,
reliability, and equal treatment sought by the rule of law." MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW
FORGIVE? 146 (2019).
111.
Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic
Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 550-51 (2010); Stephanie Hennette-Vauchez,
A Human Dignitas? Remnants of the Ancient Legal Concept in Contemporary Dignity Jurisprudence, 9
INT'L J. CONST. L. 32, 53-56 (2011) (arguing that "dignitarian" prohibitions on conduct, such as
prostitution and dwarf-throwing, on the ground that it demeans the self, owe more to the Roman
concept of "dignitas" as respect afforded to individuals based on rank than the modern version of
"human dignity for everybody").

UC IRV1NE IAW REVIEW

304

[
11:287
[Vol.

relegate people (and especially racial minorities) with criminal records to permanent
second-class citizenship. I will discuss these risks, which justify state involvement
to disrupt the stigma of criminal records, in Sections III.B-C.
While the state may interfere with the dignity interests of individuals convicted
of a crime,1 1 2 dignity requires that shaming must have a legitimate purpose. Once a
record no longer indicates a heightened risk, there is little justification for making it
available to employers. The only criminology theory that would make criminal
records available to employers is general deterrence theory, on the ground that
people who know they will be subject to an employer aversion will be less likely to
engage in crime.113 This is a contestable claim, however, and must be weighed
against the stigma of a criminal record, its magnification of racial bias, and its
criminogenic effect. And it is no justification at all once the individual has
rehabilitated.
This insistence that the dignity interest of individuals released from
incarceration requires freedom from arbitrary state-imposed barriers is aligned with
the "crucial distinction" made by John Braithwaite in Crime, Shame and Reintegration
between "shaming that is reintegrative and shaming that is disintegrative
(stigmatization)." 1 1 4 Reintegrative shaming does not offend dignity because its
intent is to reaccept the individual into society, while disintegrative shaming violates
dignity in both its expression of contempt and in undermining the individual's
capacity for dignity." 5 Permanent stigmas that mark people with criminal records
as inferior also impedes the equal citizenship of African Americans, Latinxs, and the
poor, who disproportionately must find work in the shadow of the carceral state.
B. Labor Redemption as a Right to Removal of Arbitray Barriersto Work
This Part has so far traced the dignity interest in labor redemption and argued
that individuals with a criminal record have an interest in the disruption of stigmas
that unnecessarily prevent work that is required for reintegration. This Section
identifies in recent reentry reforms a series of rights with important implications for
work law.

112.
ROSEN, supra note 7171, at 113 ("Dignity can be forfeited as a consequence of
criminal actions.").
113.
As Professor Jacobs explains, "[gleneral deterrence is the only punishment theory that
requires criminal records to be public." JACOBS, supra note 49, at 222.
114.
BRAITHWAITE, supranote 9, at 55.
115.
Id. This is aligned with Professor Waldron's view that dignity does not require allowing
"people to evade legal coercion and punishment when that is appropriate; they just coerce and punish
in what is ultimately a more respectful way." WALDRON, supra note 77, at 146; see also Don Herzog,
AristocraticDignity?, in DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 99, 110 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012) ("[A]t stake
in Waldron's concern with how we treat criminals is that you can't forfeit this kind of
dignity.. .. [C]riminals still have claims on how we may and may not treat them .... [Otherwise we
express] a kind of aristocratic contempt for the underlings.").
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Compared with other industrialized nations, labor redemption is a new topic
in the United States and lacks federal elaboration.116 In contrast, redemption is an
express right in most of Europe, requiring the removal of most unnecessary
state-imposed barriers to work.1 17 In the United Kingdom, for example, completion
of a "rehabilitation period" after committing some crimes entitles the individual to
be "treated as a rehabilitated person .. . and that conviction for those purposes
[will] be treated as spent [or expunged]."118 Employers in Germany, like other
European countries, generally do not have access to criminal record history and may
only ask about convictions if they are incompatible with a position.' 19 While recent
federal bills, especially the REDEEM Act,1 20 have proposed reforms along these
lines, there is no analogous federal right to redemption in the United States.
Yet, the emerging trend in the United States, especially since the 2007 Second
Chance Act, is for states to expand labor redemption rights through a vast array of
policy innovations to encourage reintegration.121 Beginning with drug courts in the
1990s, the United States has developed "a range of problem-solving courts serving
low-level offenders in areas such as mental health, veteran's affairs, and community
reentry for formerly incarcerated citizens."1 22 States have increasingly adopted
for these courts, including
rehabilitation programming as resources
"post-incarceration mental health services, drug treatment programs, housing
assistance, and job search help."1 23
While spanning a broad range of barriers to reintegration, easing the stigma of
a criminal record as a marker of risk in employment figures prominently in
second-chance legislative reforms. These reforms collectively establish a tripartite

Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 502-06.
116.
The European Convention "prohibits treating inmates as if they are beyond redemption,"
117.
Eva S. Nilsen, Deceny, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional
Discourse, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 111, 161 (2007), and "[i]nternational law has found that barriers to a
prisoner's successful reintegration violate his fundamental dignity rights," id. at 166. "Outside of the
United States, access to criminal records is far more limited and closely guarded." Christopher Uggen
& Robert Stewart, Piling on: CollateralConsequences and Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REv. 1871,
1911 (2015). Most European countries automatically expunge convictions after a period of time. Id.; see
also JACOBS, supra note 49, at 276.
118.
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53 (Eng.).
119. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 276.
120.
H.R. 2410, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to seal or expunge federal nonviolent
criminal offenses).
121.
The U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance has provided 900 grants to non-profit organizations,
most often to provide employment-related reentry services to people who have a criminal record. See
NAT'L REENTRY RES. CTR. & COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'TS JUST. CTR., REENTRY
MATTERS: STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES OF SECOND CHANCE ACT GRANTEES 1 (2018), https://
2
[https://
nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/ 018/11/Reentry-Matters-2018.pdf
perma.cc/AE5V-UQPA].
122. Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1579,
1581 (2018); see, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 154-75 (2008) (criticizing the administrative design
of reentry courts as too disconnected from "[t]he system of corrections[, which] is the primary body
responsible for providing education and vocational training for inmates").
123.
Radice, supra note 14, at 1357.
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set of labor redemption rights: (1) to remove old and minor convictions from access
by employers; (2) to provide markers of rehabilitation for the recently incarcerated
for use in employment; and (3) to offer employers incentives to hire people with
criminal records.
1. Removal of Markers of Riskfrom Employment Consideration
Over the past two years, twenty states have "created or broadened" access to
124
These "clean slate" innovations
sealing and expungement of minor convictions.
remove the criminal record from consideration for employment purposes, either by
deleting the record or restricting public access to it.125 While most of these require
the person with a conviction to petition for relief, a number of states have sought
to expand their use by automating sealing procedures. Pennsylvania in 2018 enacted
the Clean Slate Act, becoming the first state to automatically seal convictions, in
that instance of most misdemeanor convictions after 10 years without a subsequent
conviction.1 26 One year after taking effect, Pennsylvania reported having removed
about 35 million misdemeanor convictions from public view.1 27 Since then,
Michigan, Utah, New Jersey, and California have also enacted their own clean slate
legislation. 28 Michigan's 2020 legislation automatically expunges most felony
29
California
convictions after ten years and misdemeanors after seven years.1
requires the automatic expungement of low-level marijuana convictions1 30 and,
effective 2021, most misdemeanor convictions after one year.131 Some states
expressly link clean slate innovations to reentry programing, as in New Jersey, which
provides for presumptive, automatic expungement of minor crimes for individuals
32
who complete that state's drug court program.1

N.Y.

124.
Alan Blinder, Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records FindMore Prosecutors Willing to Help,
TIMsE (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/us/expungement-criminal-

justice.html [https://perma.cc/NK7S-8ANS].
125.
Id. The terms "sealing" and "expungement" are technical and differ by state. Generally,
expunging refers to the deletion of a criminal record from official repositories, except for the official
court record, while sealing merely prevents access to records by third parties, such as employers. Jenny
Roberts, Expunging America's Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 324 (2015).
126.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2 (2018).
Laurie Mason Schroeder, In One Year, Pa.'s Clean Slate Law Has Erased 35 Million
127.
Crimes. What's Next?, MORNING CAL. (June 30, 2020, 5:59 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/
breaking/mc-nws-pennsylvania-clean-slate-law-one-year-20200630-ges77qb3ffahhiznbjzjtelq7q-story.

html [https://perma.cc/2GJA-N9CG].
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102(5)(a)(iii)(A)
128.

(West 2020) (establishing automatic
expungement of misdemeanor convictions after five to seven years); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:52-5.3 to
-5.4 (West 2020) (establishing task force to develop automated expungement process).
Beth LeBlanc, Whitmer Signs 'Clean Slate' Legislation Aiming to Expand Expungement
129.
https://www.detroitnews.com/
3:03 PM),
Opportunities, DiT. NEwS (Oct. 12, 2020,
story/news/local/michigan/2020/l10/12/whitmer-clean-slate-legislation-expanding-expungement/
5966512002/ [https://perma.cc/K3GF-4LD4].
Assemb. B. 1793, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
130.
Assemb. B. 1076, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
131.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2019).
132.
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2. Providing Markers of Rehabilitationfor Employers
Fourteen states additionally issue certificates of relief, which typically signal to
the employer that the criminal record does not indicate a heightened risk in the
workplace. 133 Markers of rehabilitation are particularly important for individuals
with more serious convictions that cannot be expunged or sealed. New York, for
example, offers a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities as a form of sentencing
relief, and a Certificate of Good Conduct after a waiting period at the discretion of
sentencing judges or parole boards. 134 Both create a rebuttable presumption of
rehabilitation for future employment or occupational licensing requirements.13 5
This requires evidence of a direct relationship between the job qualification and the
36
conviction to support the denial.1

3. Offering State Incentivesfor Hire
The federal government for decades has provided bonding and insurance for
employers who hire people with criminal records. The Federal Bonding Program
insures employers in case of workplace theft by employees with a recent criminal
record.1 37 Since 2015, the federal government has offered private employers a Work
Opportunity Tax Credit who hire people with felony convictions.1 38 Six states
provide analogous tax and bonding incentives for employers that hire people with
recent convictions.

139

Taken together, labor redemption is legal entitlement to removal of a
state-imposed stigma unrelated to actual risk to employers, co-workers, or
customers. Imposing these legal obligations on the state is justified as a
precondition for individuals to comply with the state requirement to find and keep
work after release from incarceration. Reconceiving of employment rights for
people with criminal records in this way expands employment protections without
requiring new employment laws or imposing additional legal obligations on private

133.

See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 5-5.5-15(f) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-173.2 (2019);

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.25-G(2) (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8014 (2016);
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE
AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 3 (2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/
[https://
uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf
perma.cc/B9N2-WBQY]. Colorado permits petitioning for an "order of collateral relief" for almost all
crimes as early as sentencing. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-107 (2018).
134.
Radice, supranote 14, at 1367.
135.
Id
136.
Id.
137. About the FBP, FED. BONDING PROGRAM, http://www.bonds4jobs.com/programbackground.html [https://perma.cc/2NLG-3KPB] (last visited Nov. 13, 2020).
See Work Opportunity Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses138.
22, 2020)
(Sept.
[https://perma.cc/2T4F-YV6H]
self-employed/work-opportunity-tax-credit
(describing $2,500 tax credit per hired individual with a criminal record).
Those states are California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas. See
139.
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17053.34 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.752 (2017); MD. CODE
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 11-702 (West 2016); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.654 (West 2014); IOWA CODE
5 422.35 (2019).
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employers. Further elaboration of labor redemption to counteract employer
aversions based on factors other than bona fide risk are detailed in Part IV.
III. ASSESSING LABOR REDEMPTION IN WORK LAW

The previous Part argued that individuals have a dignity interest in labor
redemption and reconceived recent second-chance reforms as a right to the state
removal of unnecessary barriers to work necessary for reintegration.
This Part will assess labor redemption in constitutional, statutory, and
common law claims in the workplace. Labor redemption offers a stable
constitutional ground for challenges to re-incarceration for failure to find work and
denials of public employment and occupational licenses. Second-chance reforms
resolve the structural weaknesses in Title VII and Ban the Box laws by providing
plaintiffs with evidence of rehabilitation and shifting the costs of reintegration away
from employers and to the state. They also permit courts to balance labor
redemption against the security interests of customers and other third parties in
negligent hiring claims.

A. ConstitutionalRight to Challenge Re-Incarcerationfor Failureto Find Work, and
State Denialof Public Employment and Occupationallicenses
Constitutional recognition of redemption has historically been limited by the
traditional distinction between the sentence imposed by a conviction and
"collateral" consequences that result from a criminal conviction but are not a part
of the sentence. Designation of state-imposed work barriers as "collateral" can place
them beyond the reach of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.14 Despite Sixth
Amendment challenges to collateral consequences and theorization of further
14 1
cracks in the formal division between direct and collateral consequences,

Courts have generally held that state denials of employment and occupational licenses are
140.
"collateral" consequences insufficiently connected to the criminal proceeding to implicate the Eighth
Amendment. See Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 521; Rasky v. Dep't of Registration
& Educ., 410 N.E.2d 69, 79 (III. App. Ct. 1980) (finding that "revocation of a professional license is
not a criminal sanction and the [E]ighth [Almendment has no application here"); Booker v. City of
New York, 14 Civ. 9801 (PAC) (HBP), 2017 WL 151625, at *6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017) (denying
Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of employment because denial was not a part of a sentence
and was unconnected to a criminal proceeding).
The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), found that removal
141.
proceedings for noncitizen offenders implicate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel "because of its close connection to the criminal process," its severe consequences for
noncitizen offers, and the recent near-automatic removal requirements under immigration law. Id. at
365-66. Courts have relied on Padilla to find a Sixth Amendment right to be advised that a guilty plea
will result in sex offender registration and civil commitment. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral
Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REv. 87,
105-09 (2011). Paul Crane proposes to extend the reasoning of Padilla to require a jury trial under the
Sixth Amendment for similarly severe collateral consequences, such as sex offender registration and
extended firearm prohibitions. Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal
Procedure, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1, 29-42 (2019). Jack Chin draws on the Supreme Court's
designation of civil death as a punishment that implicates Eighth Amendment scrutiny to argue that the
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extending criminal procedure challenges to state-imposed barriers to work seems
implausible in the short term.1 42
Labor redemption, nonetheless, provides a stable ground for due process and
equal protection challenges to incarceration for violating work mandates, and
denials of public employment and occupational licenses because of criminal records.
The necessity of labor redemption in order to secure the dignity of people with
criminal records, and to comply with state work requirements, suggests an
important due process right. Federal policy in the past three administrations
encourages the reintegration of individuals into society after incarceration through
work. Disrupting state-imposed stigmas that unnecessarily consign people with
criminal records to a subclass of unemployable people is necessary to a well-ordered
society in which eight percent of adults and one-third of African American adult
males have a felony conviction.1 43 Permanent stigmatization of this population
without an opportunity to show rehabilitation denies equal dignity to millions of
members of racial minorities whose criminal records have relegated them to
permanent second-class status. Reintegrating this population into the formal labor
market requires the opportunity for people with criminal records to
demonstrate rehabilitation.
The most direct constitutional application of labor redemption is to the
re-incarceration of individuals for failure to pay fines or penalties because of
inability to find work. The Supreme Court in Bearden v. Georgia14 held that revoking
probation for failure to pay a fine violates due process and equal protection unless
the government "determin[es] that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide
45
efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist."1
Bearden requires that the government, before re-incarcerating individuals for failure
to obtain work or to pay fines or penalties, provide individuals with an opportunity
to show that their joblessness is a result of barriers, and not unwillingness,
to work.1 46

entire network of collateral consequences taken together can comprise a "new civil death." Gabriel

J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789,
1825-26 (2012). Beth Colgan argues for Eighth Amendment scrutiny of suspension of public benefits,
food stamps, and public housing as a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
akin to the abuse of civil forfeiture disapproved of in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). Beth
A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtor's Prison, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2,
16 (2018).
As Professor Crane explains, collateral consequences are "varied and messy," leaving
142.
"courts ... understandably and predictably hesitant to widen those cracks given the incommensurability
issues and line-drawing problems associated with incorporating collateral consequences." Crane, supra
note 141, at 28.
143.
Shannon et al., supra note 21, at 13.
461 U.S. 660 (1983).
144.
Id. at 661-62.
145.
See, e.g., Brown v. McNeil, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260-61 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that
146.
revocation of conditional release for failure to pay fees despite testimony that petitioner had insufficient
income to pay at the time violated due process); Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 375
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that revocation of probation for failure to pay fees violated due process
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Labor redemption can also provide stable footing for due process challenges
to denials of public employment and occupational licenses. While a criminal record
harms reputation,1 47 the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis14s held that reputational
9
harm by itself is not a constitutional injury.14 Nor does reputational harm and a
diffuse burdening of another interest, such as a "general fear of harm
to ... employment prospects" caused by an accurate but incomplete conviction
history.15 0 Most courts of appeals have declined to recognize a federal constitutional
right to privacy in government records suggesting criminal conduct.151 Reputational
harm is insufficient on its own to create legal entitlement to redemption in
most jurisdictions.
Paul, nevertheless, declined to overrule precedent finding that state
52
stigmatization of individuals with no notice or hearing violates due process1 and
allowed that state-imposed stigmas can violate due process if they harm reputation
and "more tangible interests."1 53 Courts have since found the Paulstigma-plus test
satisfied in cases in which allegations of criminal conduct causes harm to reputation

because the state failed to consider testimony that petitioner diligently looked for but could not find
work and had no family resources).
147.
Extending Bernadette Atuahene's theory of a "dignity taking," Jamila Jefferson-Jones
argues that a criminal record's "ongoing damage to [the] reputation" of a person with a conviction can
constitute a dignity taking that frustrates the individual's "investment-backed expectations" to
reintegrate into society. Jefferson-Jones, supranote 50, at 868 (discussing Bernadette Atuahene, Digniy
Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Frameworkfor Understanding Involuntary
Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 799 (2016)). But Professor
Jefferson-Jones rightly does not argue that reputation alone can establish a due process entitlement
under the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 870-74 (analogizing the previously incarcerated individual's
"investment-backed expectations" in rehabilitation with those of real property owners).
148.
424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See id. at 712 (finding that publication of plaintiff's name as an "active shoplifter" by police
149.
after arrest did not violate due process because "the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither
'liberty' nor 'property' guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law").
Filteau v. Prudenti, 161 F. Supp. 3d 284, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
150.
Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no privacy interest in
151.
expunged criminal record); Willan v. Columbia Cnty., 280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 2002); Nilson
v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim that individual has a protected interest
against disclosure of expunged criminal record).
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (labeling of individual as alcoholic and
152.
posting of person's name in all liquor outlets prohibiting sale to individual by state without notice or
hearing violates due process).
Paul, 424 U.S. at 701-02.
153.
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and the loss of public-sector employment, 154 denial or revocation of an occupational
license, 155 state assignment of sex offender status,1 56 and denial of parole.1 57
Labor redemption can form a basis for a constitutional challenge to denial of
public employment and state occupational licensing restrictions, under the
stigma-plus standard. In these instances, due process requires, at minimum, a nexus
between the conviction and the qualifications for the position.1 58 Categorical hiring
and licensing bans for people with felony convictions fail to meet this nexus
requirement and do not survive equal protection rational basis review.159 Mississippi
in Chunn v. State ex re. Mississippi Department of Insurance160 is emblematic of this
widely held view. That case involved a denied application to renew a bail-agent
license by an individual who previously held a license as a bail agent in the state for
twenty years, because of a new state law imposing a lifetime bar for applicants with
felony convictions.161 The individual had been convicted of marijuana possession
thirty years before. 162 Reasoning that rational basis review requires a showing of a
"rational relation to some legitimate end" or a "legitimate government interest," the

See, e.g., Horner v. Cnty. Bd., 828 F. Supp. 604, 608-10 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (dismissing
154.
public-sector employee and falsely accusing employee of fraud satisfies stigma plus requirement).
155.
See, e.g., Burns v. Alexander, 776 F. Supp. 2d 57, 80-83 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that the
public accusation of child abuse that resulted in loss of license to operate child care facility satisfies
stigma plus standard).
See Chambers v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2000); Lindsey
156.
Webb, The Procedural Due Process Rights of the Stigmatized Prisoner, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1055,
1075-79 (2013). In these cases, designation of sex offender status interferes with reputation and
liberty interests.
157.
A denial of parole based, in part, on an erroneous notation of a murder conviction in a
pre-sentence report satisfies stigma-plus because it is a "material state-imposed burden or
state-imposed alteration of plaintiff's status or rights." Hall v. Marshall, 479 F. Supp. 2d 304, 314

(E.D.N.Y. 2007).
I have previously argued in favor of a "nexus" requirement, which would require an
158.
employer to conclude that a criminal record is directly related to a job responsibility before taking
adverse action. Andrew Elmore, Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability
Approach for the Use of CriminalRecords in Hiring, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 991, 1030-34 (2015).
159. See, e.g., Barletta v. Riuling, 973 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138-39 (D. Conn. 2013) (finding that a
refusal to grant a license to trade in precious metals to any applicant "convicted of any felony" violates
equal protection because there is no rational basis for a categorical disqualification); Furst
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[A] municipal employer[, to
survive rational basis review,] must demonstrate some relationship between the commission of a
particular felony and the inability to adequately perform a particular job."); Kindem v. City of Alameda,
502 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding that a ban on hiring any individual with a felony
conviction "is not rationally related to any legitimate state interests"); Butts v. Nichols, 381
F. Supp. 573, 574 (S.D. Iowa 1974) ( "[A]n across-the-board prohibition against the employment of
felons in civil service positions" fails rational basis review.); Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077,
1082 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that automatic disqualification of any applicant convicted of a felony
for a private investigator and security guard license violates equal protection because there was no
rational basis).
160.
156 So. 3d 884 (Miss. 2015).
161.
Id. at 884.
162.
Id. at 885.
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Mississippi Supreme Court held that a flat ban fails even the "lenient" rational
basis test. 163
Labor redemption further requires an individualized risk assessment before
164
Pennsylvania, which
denial of public employment and occupational licenses.
165
shows how labor redemption can ground this
constitutionally protects reputation,
due process challenge. While Pennsylvania finds that reputation as a substantive
due process right is not fundamental, the deprivation "must not be unreasonable,
unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means
which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to
be attained." 166 Pennsylvania has relied on the right to reputation to constitutionally
167
to reverse
protect the right to expungement of arrest records following acquittal,
criminal
people
with
hiring
ban
on
on
a
flat
based
public
employment
of
denials
69
168
to strike down a
or a lifetime ban for felony convictions,1
record histories
lifetime juvenile sex registration provision,1 70 and to protect the "right to engage in
any of the common occupations of life."171 Applying its version of a rational basis
test, a Pennsylvania court, for example, found a ten-year felony conviction ban as
applied to a groundskeeper to a school violated due process because there was no
evidence that the employee's seven-year-old conviction for lying on an application
for a firearm directly related to his ability to "diligently, faithfully, and honestly mow
lawns and trim bushes at [employer's] behest."1

72

Consistent with this approach,

163.
Id. at 886.
Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 449 (5th Cir. 1973) (striking down on equal
164.
protection grounds an "ordinance which bars that class of persons from city employment, without any
consideration of the merits of each individual case"). This point is similar to Miriam Aukerman's
argument that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine applies to occupational license restrictions. See
Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Frameworkfor Evaluating
OccupationalRestrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOc'Y 18, 76 (2005).
Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees "certain inherent and
165.
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing and protecting property and reputation." PA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954).
166.
167.
Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1997).
168.
Sec'y of Revenue v. John's Vending Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. 1973) (finding that "a
blanket prohibition barring anyone who has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude without
regard to the remoteness of those convictions or the individual's subsequent performance would
be unreasonable").
See, e.g., Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
169.
(finding that a lifetime ban on employees with felony convictions in public schools violates due
process); Croll v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., No. 210 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 8668130, at *7
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (finding that a lifetime ban violates due process because there is "no
temporal proximity to his present ability to perform the duties of [plaintiff's] position, and ... does not
bear a real and substantial relationship to the" position).
In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 16-17 (Pa. 2014).
170.
171. Johnson, 59 A.3d at 20.

172.

Megraw v. Sch. Dist. of Cheltenham Twp., No. 577 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 2012130, at *9

(Pa. Commw. Ct. May 1, 2018).
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labor redemption requires a name-clearing hearing for permanent occupational bars
173
and categorical denial of public employment.
B. Removal of StructuralLimitations of Title VII and Ban the Box Laws
The United States primarily regulates employer rejections of people with
criminal records under the equality protection of Title VII disparate impact theory,
and, to a lesser extent, state and local "Ban the Box" privacy restrictions. Title VII
does not consider people with criminal records to be a protected class, but the
EEOC in 2012 issued guidance instructing employers of its view that background
174
checks have a disparate impact on African Americans and Latinxs. Automatically
excluding individuals because of a criminal record, accordingly, "would need to be
narrowly tailored to identify criminal conduct with a demonstrably tight nexus to
the position in question." 175 Second, thirty-five states and 150 local governments
have enacted "Ban the Box" laws, regulating the timing of when an employer may
ask about a criminal record, typically until the interview stage. While most of Ban
the Box laws regulate public employment, twelve states extend this protection to
76
private-sector employers as well.1
Title VII and Ban the Box laws, however, provide little protection against the
broad exclusion of people with criminal records from the workforce. This Section
will first explain how structural limitations blunt the effectiveness of these laws and
then show how labor redemption as reflected in clean slate reforms resolves these
structural limitations.

1. People with CriminalRecords Are Not a ProtectedClass Under Title VII, and
Employers Often Prevailin Showing a Business Necessity for Background Checks in
Title VII DisparateImpact Claims
People with criminal records have a limited claim to equality in the United
States, which is often outweighed by the employer's interest in public safety. Federal
equality protections, reflected in Tide VII, seek to minimize the role of morally
arbitrary factors in employment1 77 and dismantle the long-term consequences of

See, e.g., Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that "an
173.
adequate, reasonably prompt, post-termination name-clearing hearing" satisfies the procedural
requirement of a stigma-plus claim by individual terminated from public-sector, at-will employment).
EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 7.
174.
175. Id.
See BETH AVERY, NAT'L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, BAN THE Box 1 (2019), https:/
176.
/s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-April19.pdf

[https://perma.cc/BB6E-FFPD].
Liberal egalitarianism seeks to avoid harm for morally arbitrary reasons and prohibits
177.
discrimination against an employee "for the morally arbitrary reason that she belongs to a protected
group." Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection:An Alternative to Antipoverty
Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 27. Fair equality of opportunity, according to John Rawls,
justifies dismantling inherited social advantages, including on the basis of race, sex and class, on the
ground that people with the same talent and willingness should have the same prospects. JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72-73 (1971).
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entrenched group-based inequalities.1 78 But Title VII leaves in place other employer
decisions, even if grounded in group-based assumptions, so long as those
assumptions do not cause "greater harm to the groups that are on the 'wrong' side
of society's stereotypical judgments." 179 This equality protection "concerns itself
80
only with those kinds of stigma that are plainly unjustified,"1 while permitting
others, such as stigmas imposed by the state for criminal conduct.181
Limiting employment discrimination protections to groups on the wrong side
of stereotypical judgments rests on contestable claims about who is deserving of
protections. 82 Jessica Clarke criticizes this limitation, which "focuses attention on
the victims of discrimination and their blameworthy or costly choices, rather than
the systemic effects of biases that are not required for the workplace to function,"
and "reinforces stereotypes of the sort that antidiscrimination law is intended to
disrupt."1 83 To address this limitation, Joseph Fishkin offers an "opportunity
pluralism" theory of equal opportunity, which would justify restrictions on any
employer policy that constricts opportunity structures whether or not they burden
a particular protected class.1 84 While offering an important critique of stigma theory,
however, opportunity pluralism does not provide an answer to conflicting rights, in
this case between people with markers of risk seeking employment, and employers,
5
consumers, and co-workers seeking workplaces free of violence and theft.18
Perhaps for this reason, while Australia and some states in the United States
consider people with criminal records a protected class,' 86 similar extension of Tide
VII seems implausible.

178.
SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, THE LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 62 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT]; Samuel
R. Bagenstos, "RationalDiscrimination,"Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89
VA. L. REv. 825, 839-45 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination].
BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 178, at 62.
179.
ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 72 (1996).
180.
181. John Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 141 (1981) (describing stigmas
for criminal conduct as an example of those that are "permissible or even desirable").
182. Jessica Clarke characterizes this dividing line as the "new immutability" that defines
protected characteristics as those essential to personal identity, to separate characteristics such as
disability from other forms of discrimination, such as "obesity, pregnancy, and criminal records." Jessica
A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YAIE; L.J. 2, 10 (2015). Joseph Fishkin argues that viewing moral
arbitrariness as solely a function of advantages from birth ignores the problem of "bleak opportunities"
that are the result of a person's past failures. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 239-53 (2014).
Clarke, supra note 182, at 11-12.
183.
For Professor Fishkin, restrictions on employer inquiries about height, weight, receipt of
184.
public assistance, place of birth, or criminal records are all justified on opportunity pluralism grounds.
FISHKIN, supra note 182, at 239-53.
See, e.g., Jack N. Kondrasuk, Herff L. Moore & Hua Wang, Negligent Hiring: The Emergent
185.
Contributorto Workplace Violence in the Public Sector, 30 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 185, 187 (2001).
Elena Larrauri Pijoan, Legal ProtectionsAgainst Criminal Background Checks in Europe, 16
186.
PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 50, 57 (2014) (using Australia as an example); NAT'L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES, STATE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 3-13 (2015), https://
www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB9J-JVJC].
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Criminal background checks can nonetheless violate Title VII under a
disparate treatment 187 or a disparate impact theory.1 88 Courts, however, are reluctant
to extend equality protections to people with criminal records, unless the employer's
background check is facially overbroad, applied in an obviously discriminatory
fashion, or the candidate can demonstrate her own rehabilitation.
A disparate treatment claim must overcome the employer's defense that the
criminal record is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for nonhire with evidence
creating an inference of discriminatory animus,1 89 typically through comparator
evidence. But courts can structure the similarly situated evidence requirement 90 in
ways that can be impossible to obtain. In Rogers v. Pearland Independent School
District,191 for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a Title VII disparate treatment
claim based on evidence that the plaintiff, who is Black, was not hired because he
failed to disclose drug-related convictions despite the employer's hiring of a white
candidate who also failed to disclose a drug-related conviction. Affirming the trial
court, the appellate court found that the white applicant was not a "legitimate
comparator" because the Black candidate had three drug-related convictions while
the white candidate had only one.1 92 This proof structure requires plaintiffs to show
identical reasons for nonhire and an identical criminal record, a heightened burden
that often cannot be met, particularly in smaller workplaces. 193 As the partial dissent
in Rogers noted, requiring both identical reasons for the employment action and
identical underlying circumstances "effectively immunizes employers from

187.
Under a disparate treatment theory, employers may violate Title VII in rejecting applicants
with a criminal record if the rejection is because of race or national origin, as shown by the employer's
preferential treatment of white applicants with similar criminal record histories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b).
As the EEOC Guidance notes, Pager's findings of racial disparities in how employers perceive the risk
of equivalent criminal records reported by in-person applicants suggests that rejections because of
criminal record history can be because of race or national origin discrimination. See EEOC GUIDANCE,
supra note 7, at 34-35 n.55.
In a Title VII disparate impact theory, an employer's criminal background check policy
188.
may be unlawful even without evidence of unlawful intent, if the policy adversely impacts racial
minorities without sufficient employer justification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
See, e.g., Williams v. At. Health Sys., No. 15-cv-06366, 2017 WL 1900725, at *6
189.
(D.N.J. May 8, 2017) (dismissing Title VII disparate treatment claim because criminal record was a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for revocation of hire).
190.
A prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII can require a showing that the
plaintiff was treated differently from a "similarly situated" individual outside the protected class.
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258-59 (1981).

191.

827 F.3d 403 (5th Cit. 2016).

192.
Id. at 410. The Fifth Circuit "nearly identical" requirement for comparators has been
criticized by the Eleventh Circuit as unnecessarily rigid. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213,
1224 (11th Cit. 2019); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (permitting use
of comparator evidence to show intent if "the distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed
comparators are not so significant that they render the comparison effectively useless" (internal
quotations and citation omitted)).
193.
See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 764 (2011)
(critiquing similarly situated requirement for limiting intersectional claims).
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disparate treatment claims unless the plaintiff is able to show that he shares identical
traits with the alleged comparator."' 94
Because disparate impact requires no evidence of discriminatory intent, Title
VII disparate impact litigation has had more success in challenging criminal record
prohibitions. 195 This requires an initial showing that the employment practice has a
disparate impact on a protected class, after which the burden of production shifts
to the employer to show that the policy is job related and consistent with business
necessity.1 96 The EEOC Guidance has persuaded some courts to deny employer
motions to dismiss these complaints based on data showing national arrest and
197
But here too, courts often
conviction disparities by race and national origin.
impose heightened proof structures that limit the reach of these disparate impact
challenges. Courts often reject the use of national data to show a disparity and
express skepticism about the accuracy of plaintiff's statistical analysis of
employer data.198
The most important structural limitation to Title VII is a broad construction
of the employer's defense that the criminal record exclusion is job related and
consistent with business necessity. The business necessity defense requires courts
to balance the equality interests of applicants with criminal records against the risk

827 F.3d at 410 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Suzanne Goldberg
194.
argues that the similarly situated requirement forces plaintiffs to identify a "coworker who not only has
comparable job responsibilities and lacks the same protected trait but also has the same unprotected
attribute," a heightened burden that often cannot be met, particularly in smaller workplaces. Goldberg,
supra note 193.
195.
See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class
Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of Settlement Class, Appointment of Class Counsel, and
Approval of Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice of Settlement, Fortune Soc'y, Inc. et al. v. Macy's, Inc.,
19-cv-05961 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2020), ECF No. 105 (approving class settlement of Title VII disparate
impact challenge to criminal background check in hiring); Times v. Target Corp., No. 18 Civ. 02993,
2019 WL 5616867, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019) (approving class settlement of claim); Little

v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 313 F. Supp. 3d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2018), appealdismissed, No. 18-7071,
2018 WL 4600770 (D.C. Cit. Sept. 11, 2018) (same).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
196.
See, e.g., Lee v. Hertz Corp., 330 F.R.D. 557, 561 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (denying motion to
197.
dismiss disparate impact challenge by Latinx candidate of employer ban on hiring anyone with a criminal
record because of general disparities in criminal record histories); Williams v. Compassionate Care
Hospice, No. 16-2095, 2016 WL 4149987, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2016) (adopting EEOC Guidance
position that national racial disparities in criminal record histories suffice to survive motion to dismiss);

McCain v. United States, No. 2:14-cv-92, 2015 WL 1221257, at *17 (D. Vt. Mar. 17, 2015) (same).
198. See Manley v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. H-19-4987, 2020 WL 3038132, at *6
(S.D. Tex. May 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by No. H-19-4987, 2020 WL 3036308
(S.D. Tex. June 5, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss, rejecting general statistics showing conviction

disparities by race); Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 18-CV-6591, 2019 WL 3237361, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July
18, 2019) (same); see also Elmore, supra note 158, at 1016-20 (discussing EEOC v. Freeman, 961

F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013); EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 2882,
2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013)). The Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC Guidance is not
enforceable and enjoined its enforcement in Texas. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 451 (5th
Cit. 2019) (finding that EEOC Guidance is not enforceable because the EEOC "lacks authority to
promulgate substantive rules implementing Title VII").
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signaled by a criminal record. 199 But courts often lack sufficient information to
assess the bona fide risk of a criminal record.200 At times courts have reacted to this
tension in ways that minimize equality interests in Title VII disparate impact claims
201
or adopt a status-based, racialized view of dignity.
Even for more reasoned attempts to grapple with this tension, the conflicting
rights at stake place important limitations on the reach of Title VII disparate impact
analysis. These courts recognize that Title VII prohibits employer criminal
background checks that would create a subclass of unemployable individuals. But
courts often reject these Title VII claims so long as the employer's criminal
background check is facially reasonable. In those cases, courts impose a heightened
requirement on plaintiffs to show their rehabilitation. This proof structure greatly
limits the reach of Title VII disparate impact claims in this area.
The two leading Title VII disparate impact cases challenging background
checks, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad202 and El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
TransportationAuthority, 2 03 demonstrate how Title VII recognizes labor redemption
and equality as independent, important interests, even as structural limitations in
Title VII disparate impact theory narrow its reach. In Green, the Eighth Circuit
considered whether an employer's practice of excluding from employment all
individuals with a criminal conviction, except minor traffic offenses, was justified
by business necessity. 204 The Eighth Circuit first analyzed the comparable interests
of the parties, finding that the employer had a low interest in the policy, having
205
It then
failed to validate it or show that a less restrictive test would not suffice.
found that the policy burdens the labor redemption interests of people with criminal
records, who would be automatically placed "in the permanent ranks of the
unemployed." 206 Lastly, it found that this policy separately interferes with the
equality interests of "blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the burdens of

Courts can sometimes avoid this confrontation by relying on an employer's obvious failure
199.
to consider the qualifications of candidates with criminal records. See Guerrero v. Cal. Dep't of
Corr. & Rehab., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd inpart and remanded, 701
F. App'x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding EEOC Guidance persuasive, and holding that employer's "lip
service" about the risk of applicant based on criminal record history was insufficient to show a business
necessity). A balancing of interests is also unnecessary if the background check policy is legally required.
See Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 901 F.3d 1036, 1041 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of
disparate impact claim because statute prohibited hire).
FISHKIN, supra note 182, at 232-34, 252; Elmore, supra note 158, at 1020-29.
200.
One court, in dismissing a Title VII disparate impact claim, admonished that "[i]f
201.
Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of theft then, they
should stop stealing." EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
202.
523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cit. 1975).
203.
479 F.3d 232 (3d Cit. 2007).
204.
523 F.2d at 1296.
205.
Id. at 1298.
206.
Id. at 1299.
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discrimination in our society." 207 It found that this "unnecessarily harsh and unjust
burden" violated Title VII. 208
While Green established limitations on the categorical exclusion of people with
criminal records under Title VII, the Third Circuit in Elclarified that in cases where
employer background checks are facially reasonable, they do not violate Title VII
209
The plaintiff in
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate individualized rehabilitation.
Elhad a forty-year-old conviction for second-degree murder when he was 15.210 He
sought and was rejected for a position as a paratransit bus driver under the
employer's criminal record policy, which excluded any individual with "any crime
of moral turpitude or of violence." 211 The Third Circuit held that to establish a
business necessity defense under Title VII the employer need only show that the
check can "accurately distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level
of risk and those that do not." 212 In light of the position, which required the
employee to be alone with and in "close proximity to vulnerable members of
society," 213 evidence that even a forty-year-old record presents a heightened risk
214
was sufficient to dismiss the Title VII claim. While the court acknowledged the
harshness of a lifetime ban for criminal convictions, it held that the risk of harm to
paratransit passengers with physical or mental disabilities, who are often the targets
of "sexual and violent criminals," 215 justifies a lifetime ban if it decreases the risk
of harm.
Trial courts since Elhave generally followed this pattern, permitting Title VII
claims alleging that a background check has a disparate impact in instances in which
the plaintiff can demonstrate rehabilitation, while rejecting challenges to facially
216
reasonable background checks on public safety grounds.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id.
See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242-45 (3d Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id at 245.
Id at 243.

214.
In El, the plaintiff did not challenge SEPTA's expert testimony about recidivism rates or
put forward his own experts to create a factual question for the jury, and "suffere[d] pre-trial judgment

for it." Id. at 247.
215. Id. at 245.
216. Title VII disparate impact claims are most often successful if the plaintiff already has a
positive work history for the employer before being fired by the employer because of a background

check. See, e.g., Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 888-92 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (finding
that plaintiffs, employed by the defendant and then terminated because of the results of a background
check, "posed no obvious risk due to their past convictions, but rather, were valuable and respected
employees, who merited a second chance"). Otherwise, these claims typically fail. See, e.g., Foxworth

v. Pa. State Police, 402 F. Supp. 2d 523, 535-36 (E.D. Pa. 2005), af'd, 228 F. App'x 151 (3d Cit. 2007)
(finding automatic criminal record disqualification for police officers justified by business necessity);

Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031
(W.D. Mo. 2008) (rejecting Title VII disparate impact claim for denial of employment in law office for
nearly thirty-year-old rape conviction on public safety grounds).
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El v. SEPTA illuminates the structural limitation of Title VII disparate impact
challenges of employer criminal background checks. Courts respond to the
uncertainty and complexity of individualized risk assessments by deferring to an
employer's facially reasonable background check, without requiring the employer to
assess the individual's rehabilitation. Courts instead place the burden on plaintiffs
to show their rehabilitation, which plaintiffs are ill equipped to meet. 21 7
A reexamination of El v. SEPTA shows how this limitation in the Title VII
disparate impact proof structure can systematically bias disparate impact claims by
people with criminal records. The Third Circuit's holding hinged on expert
testimony that "former violent criminals who have been crime free for many years
are at least somewhat more likely than members of the general population to
commit a future violent act." 218 But, taking account of the age of the applicant and
the time elapsed after the conviction, the plaintiff in Elwould have been a less risky
hire than a person from the general population, by virtue of his advanced age and
forty-year clean record.219 This is because, generally, "older people who have served
220
substantial sentences recidivate infrequently."
This is not to suggest that the Third Circuit incorrectly applied Title VII or
unreasonably denied El's claim. Instead, El demonstrates how judicial skepticism
of Title VII disparate impact theory 22 1 can manifest in proof structures that are
difficult, or impossible, for people with criminal records to meet. In light of the
contestable nature of the equality claim of people with criminal records, along with
legitimate public safety objections, extension of Title VII to address these structural
limitations is implausible.
2. Ban the Box Laws Delay but Do Not Prohibit Criminal Background Checks, and

May Increase Employer Disparate Treatment ofAfrican Americans
The most important limitation to Ban the Box laws is that they do not limit
employer consideration of a criminal record history past the interview stage. This
limited privacy protection furthers the purpose of Ban the Box laws to encourage
employers to engage in a deliberative process with applicants. Prohibiting employers

In El, the Third Circuit granted summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff
217.
did not, or could not afford to, produce a conflicting expert report to create a triable issue for the jury.
El, 479 F.3d at 276.
218.
Id. at 246-47.
219.
Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal
Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY 27,

28-30, 52 (2011).
220. J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle & Sonja B. Starr, Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism, 95
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1695 (2020). In a large, recent sample of individuals incarcerated for
murder or non-negligent manslaughter, J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle, and Sonja Starr found that none of
the individuals released at age fifty-five or older recidivate. Id at 1696.
The rejection of the need for an individualized assessment in the Title VII business
221.
necessity defense, in particular, may in part stem from a growing judicial resistance to disparate impact
theory. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
714-16 (2006).
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from preemptively and categorically excluding applicants with criminal histories
affords applicants an opportunity to first impress upon employers their interests
and qualifications for the position. This permits employers, in theory, to consider
the applicant's criminal record history in context. But without a baseline protection
against overbroad background checks later in the hiring process, it is unclear
whether Ban the Box laws reduce employer aversions to people with
222
criminal records.
A separate obstacle to extending privacy protections is that employers may
respond to Ban the Box laws by discriminating against individuals based on
stereotypes that associate racial minorities with workplace risk, sometimes referred
to as statistical discrimination. 223 Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr found that in states
that enacted Ban the Box, these laws improved the job prospects of people with
criminal records but substantially increased the Black-white gap in people who were
called back for interviews. 224 They conclude that Ban the Box laws may substantially
225
increase the employment gap between whites and African Americans.

To be sure, the conclusions and policy implications of this study are
contested. 226 Even if there is a loss in employment from privacy protections, further
study will be necessary to assess whether it is temporary or more entrenched. But it
seems plausible that pre-hiring inquiry restrictions may trigger employer
stereotyping of protected classes, 227 causing at least a short-term dip in employment
228
and
or wages. Employment discrimination law prohibits statistical discrimination,

222. See Elmore, supra note 158, at 1014-15.
Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael Stoll found that employers who conduct
223.
background checks are more likely to hire African Americans, especially if the employer reports an
aversion to criminal records. They hypothesize that employers engage in hiring discrimination against
African Americans as a form of "statistical discrimination," to screen out candidates who they assume
have criminal records. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal
Background Checks, and the Racial HiringPractices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 463, 473 (2006);
see Elmore, supra note 158, at 1035-36; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privay Versus Antidiscrimination, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364-65 (2008) (describing difficulties African Americans face in obtaining
employment or services, concluding "[r]acial animus explains some of this behavior, but in the standard
narrative, statistical discrimination is doing most of the work").
224.
Agan & Starr, supra note 62.
225. Id. at 229-30 (analyzing field study of 15,000 online job applications before and after
enactment of Ban the Box laws).
226.
Dallan Flake subsequently conducted an online field study of employer response to
applications with criminal records in jurisdictions with and without Ban the Box laws in place, finding
an increase in "employment opportunities for ex-offenders without harming racial minorities." Dallan
F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1127 (2019).
Joni Hersch and Jennifer Bennett Shinall argue that pre-hire inquiry prohibitions can
227.
trigger an ambiguity aversion, which may lead employers to choose applicants who disclose and explain
a negative credential over applicants whose negative credentials are assumed but not explained. Joni
Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information Exchange Under Employment
Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 87-88 (2016).
228. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) ("The extra cost of
employing members of one sex ... does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a
discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender."); BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS
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Agan and Starr's finding suggests that robust enforcement of antidiscrimination
protections is in order. The possibility of privacy protections triggering statistical
discrimination, however, has led numerous scholars to question the wisdom of
antidiscrimination protections that impose costs on employers that may increase
statistical discrimination. 229 One might reasonably argue that whatever benefit Ban
the Box laws confer to people with a criminal conviction is outweighed by their
230
intensification of entrenched discrimination against African Americans.
These structural limitations and objections to Title VII and Ban the Box laws
should not be overstated. Title VII remains a vital protection against overbroad
background checks, and Ban the Box laws encourage employers to engage in a more
deliberative process about whether a qualified applicant's criminal record should be
disqualifying. But this analysis suggests that these protections are stunted by deep
structural-and often state-imposed-barriers that people with criminal
records face.
3. Labor Redemption as a ConceptualTool to Resolve StructuralLimitations to Title VII
and Ban the Box Laws
Labor redemption, as expressed in recent criminal justice reforms, can resolve
these structural limitations by limiting the availability of irrelevant criminal records
to employers and making available state-issued evidence of rehabilitation. Clean
slate reforms reduce the impact of an overbroad criminal background check by
removing old and minor criminal records from consideration without directly
regulating the employer's inquiries. For individuals whose criminal records suggest
a plausible risk, certificates of relief provide candidates with evidence of redemption
to persuade employers that the record should be ignored. Certificates of relief
further the goal of a deliberative process in Ban the Box laws, by counteracting the
stigma of a criminal record with a state marker of rehabilitation. They can also be
powerful evidence in Title VII claims that an employer's criminal background check
that would exclude those candidates are not justified by business necessity. Courts
appear more willing to scrutinize an employer's rejection of an applicant if the
231
applicant has a certificate from the state signaling her redemption.

MOVEMENT, supra note 178, at 60; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 621 (2004).
229.
Strahilevitz, supra note 223, at 364 (arguing that employers react to restrictions on inquiries
about criminal record histories by relying on "racial and gender proxies" to weed out applicants with
criminal record histories). Professors Hersch and Shinall argue against flat inquiry prohibitions but in
favor of permitting inquiries at the interview stage. Hersch & Shinall, supra note 227, at 67-68, 88
("Instead of remaining shrouded in taboo and concerns about potential illegality, personal history and
family matters should be something to talk about during the interview, something to deepen both the
employer's and the applicant's understanding of each other's wants and needs.").
230.
Strahilevitz, supra note 223, at 364.
See, e.g., Brown v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp. 158, 175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying
231.
summary judgment to employer on Title VII claim because of evidence of pretext, including because
state certificate of relief from disabilities established presumption of rehabilitation); Meth v. Manhattan
& Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 134 A.D.2d 431, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (finding that
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State markers of redemption are also less likely to encourage statistical
discrimination than Ban the Box laws alone because they would only retire records
of or certify as redeemed those individuals who present no heightened risk to the
workplace. They would not prohibit employer use of criminal records that show a
bona fide risk. Concerns that employers will unfairly bear the costs of reintegration,
finally, are addressed by tax credits, insurance, and bonding programs.
This analysis suggests that encouraging the hiring of people with criminal
records will require expanding second-chance reforms, which is a more plausible
pathway to improving outcomes than directly extending the protections of Title
VII. Its call to turn to the state removal of barriers is aligned with other critical
assessments of civil rights law reform efforts. Disability law offers the closest
analogy. 232 Samuel Bagenstos, after uncovering structural limitations in the
Americans with Disabilities Act that prevent it from significantly improving the
workforce participation of people with disabilities, finds that "far and away the most
significant barrier to employment for people with disabilities is the current structure
of our health insurance system." 233 Social Security Disability Insurance and
Medicaid contain work disincentives and other barriers that "operate to keep many
people with disabilities out of the workforce well before any individual employer
has an opportunity to discriminate against them." 234 Professor Bagenstos concludes
that "the future of disability law lies as much in social welfare law as in
235
antidiscrimination law."

Gillian Lester offers a similar analysis of unpaid parental leave requirements in
and Medical Leave Act, which have not led substantial numbers of
Family
the
private-sector employers to offer paid leave for new parents. 236 This is because there
are structural limitations to employer-provided leave, including the possibility that
employers will discriminate against women of childbearing age as a result and moral
hazards that act as disincentives for private insurers to cover family leave. Professor
Lester concludes that normative values of gender equality and increasing women's
labor market participation may be best achieved by state-subsidized family leave
237
policies instead of shifting costs to employers and insurers.

denial of public employment to applicant with certificate of relief requires finding of nexus between
conviction and qualifications for position and showing that hire "would pose an unreasonable risk to
the general public'.
In making this analogy, I do not claim an equivalence in the equality claims of people with
232.
criminal records and those of people with a disability. People with a disability are members of a
protected class and as a result have greater claim to anti-discrimination law protections.
233. Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 26.
234. Id. at 34.
235. Id. at 4.
236. Lester, supra note 11.
Id. at 12-15 (arguing that actuarial insurance is unsuited to parental leave because of
237.
"overwhelming problems of moral hazard").
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This is not to suggest that imposing costs on employers is never justified.238
Labor redemption resolves limitations to existing law but does not substitute for
employer regulation. Instead, I argue that labor redemption is necessary to address
the role of the state in simultaneously imposing work as a condition of
post-incarceration release, yet limiting and foreclosing opportunities to work
through arbitrary, state-imposed barriers. Attending to the role of the state is also a
more promising route for future law reform than extensions to existing employment
laws that impose additional legal obligations on private employers.

C. Dignity Interest to Balance Against Securi'y Interests in Negligent Hiring Claims
Employer fear of negligent hiring claims has historically been "[o]ne of the
most significant impediments for employers in the hiring" of people with criminal
records. 239 To counteract this trend, law reform has sought to establish a rebuttable
presumption against negligent hiring liability for employers who comply with Title
VII in conducting a criminal background check. But employer fear of negligent
hiring liability is misplaced. Courts reject a duty to inspect criminal record history in
most instances. Negligent hiring case law is animated by an unmistakable deference
to the employer's managerial prerogatives. Further limiting negligent hiring claims
can, moreover, burden the interest of vulnerable consumers in safety and security.
This Section argues that markers of rehabilitation issued by the state can more
effectively balance labor redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims.
Employers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training,
supervision, and retention of employees, 240 which includes a duty to investigate
known risks.241 But courts generally reject a duty to inquire about criminal
records. 242 Even in instances where an employer is aware of a criminal record, courts
limit the employer's duty, requiring a tight nexus between the conviction and the
harm. 243 Typically, this requires evidence of observed employee behavior suggesting

238.
As Noah Zatz argues in critiquing the debate about whether the minimum wage and earned
income tax credit is a more targeted anti-poverty device for ignoring other values expressed in minimum
wage requirements, the equality goal of antidiscrimination law justifies shifting costs to third parties.
Zatz, supra note 177, at 23-27, 37-40 (arguing in favor of reconceiving the minimum wage as a civil
right to improve the earning capacity of people at the bottom of the income scale, rather than as an
antipoverty device).
239.
THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 113.
240.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS C 319 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
241.
See, e.g., Anicich v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2017), as
amended (Apr. 13, 2017) (reversing a trial court's dismissal of a negligent hiring claim because of evidence
of the supervisor's previous harassment of female subordinates, which created a question for the jury
about whether his later murder of a female co-worker was foreseeable).
242. See, e.g., Butler v. Harlbut, 826 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging "some
situations" may require employers to inquire about a past criminal conviction that "would necessitate a
rejection of the applicant," but finding that "[r]equiring a duty upon an employer to search every job
applicant's past criminal record, if one exists, who interacts with the public is not reasonable").
243.
See, e.g., Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 765 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that
employer with knowledge of employee's previous burglary conviction did not have a duty of care to
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the risk of future violence 244 or a showing that the work "involves a serious risk of
246
harm." 245 As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in Schmidt v. HTG, Inc.,
deference to employer managerial prerogatives is justified by the difficulty in
evaluating the risk signaled by a criminal record. In HTG, the court rejected a
negligent hiring claim based on a previous criminal conviction of an otherwise
competent employee because the employee displayed no ongoing negative
behavior. 247 The court rejected as overly onerous an employer duty to "ascertain the
detailed history of every employee, whether criminal or not, and terminate the
employment of an individual who is performing acceptable services and is clearly
not unfit or incompetent, but who does pose some degree of risk due to
248
previous actions."

While courts in rejecting these claims do not expressly consider labor
redemption, a low duty for employers in negligent hiring claims effectively avoids
imposing a legal obligation on employers that would make people with a criminal
record unemployable. 249 But the heightened knowledge requirement imposed by
courts in negligent hiring claims can burden the security interests of vulnerable
consumers. As Catherine Sharkey observes, courts overwhelmingly dismiss
negligent hiring claims, even against employers that "provide services to vulnerable
populations ... such as rehabilitation centers, schools, and churches-on the
250
grounds that the employer lacked knowledge of the risk posed by the employee."
Some clean slate reforms aiming to encourage the hiring of people with
criminal records, moreover, can be in conflict with the safety interests protected by
tort law. Louisiana and Texas impose an irrebuttable presumption that employers
cannot be found negligent in hiring and supervising individuals solely because of an
25
employee's prior criminal record in most instances. ' Florida, Massachusetts, and

family murdered in their home by employee, because, inter alia, conviction for robbery did not provide
knowledge of risk of violence).
Compare Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 506 (Tex. 2017) (finding that
244.
two previous complaints of minor harassment about co-worker were insufficient to provide the
employer with knowledge that co-worker presented a risk of violence), with Doe YZ
v. Shattuck-St. Mary's Sch., 214 F. Supp. 3d 763, 786-88 (D. Minn. 2016) (finding that specific reports
of sexual contact between students and teacher "are objectively reasonable indicators of a potentially
inappropriate relationship with students").

245.

Cramer v. Hous. Opportunities Comm'n, 501 A.2d 35, 40 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) ("[W]here

the work involves a serious risk of harm if the employee is unfit ... there is no presumption of
competence and there may well exist a duty to conduct a criminal record investigation.").
961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998).
246.
247.
Id.

248.

Id at 695.

This also theoretically avoids imposing conflicting obligations on employers hiring
249.
individuals with criminal records under Title VII and tort law, although, as discussed in the previous
section, Title VII does not require the hiring of individuals with known, significant safety risks. See supra
Section III.B.1.
250.
Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees' Intentional Torts: Vicarious
Liability as aQuasi-SubstituteforPunitive Damages, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2018).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.1 (2019); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 142.002
251.
(West 2019).
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New York establish a rebuttable presumption that employers are not liable for
negligent hiring if they comply with state law in conducting a criminal background
check.252 Minnesota limits the use of criminal background checks in negligent hiring
trials unless the hiring increased the risk to the public. 253 While these measures can
advance the redemption of people with criminal records through work, there is a
further need in these measures to preserve claims by vulnerable customers harmed
by good faith, but unreasonable, employer assessments of risk.
This Article argues that labor redemption addresses this structural limitation
to negligent hiring claims by balancing the security interests of customers against
the state's interest in rehabilitation. Courts already balance dignity and security
interests in failure to warn claims against the state for reintegrating incarcerated
individuals into society. While generally, state officers are immune from tort liability
for discretionary acts, 254 some courts have found that parole officers take charge of
parolees sufficiently to have a duty to exercise reasonable care.255 The California
2 56
Supreme Court rejected this principle in Thompson v. County of Alameda,
concluding that there is no duty to warn about the release of an inmate with a violent
history who makes nonspecific threats. 257 The Court reasoned that the precaution
of a warning about nonspecific threats would have little beneficial value and may
"negate the rehabilitative purposes of the parole and probation system by
stigmatizing the released offender in the public's eye." 258
The rejection in Thompson of claims that conflict with the state duty to
rehabilitate an individual after release, while permitting claims that establish a
specific risk, is also reflected in state determinations to seal and expunge records

New York State adopted the first version, providing for a "rebuttable presumption" that
252.
an employer who makes a reasonable and good faith determination to hire a person with a criminal
record in compliance with state corrections law does not violate state anti-discrimination laws.
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296.15 (McKinney 2019); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.096 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 6, § 172(e) (2019).
MINN. STAT. § 181.981(1) (2019). Dallan Flake offers a similar proposal that Title VII
253.
incorporate "a rebuttable presumption that an offending employee's criminal history should be
excluded from evidence in a negligent hiring case if the employer hired the individual after engaging in"
a deliberative hiring process. See Flake, supra note 6, at 95.
254.
Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that an individual who takes
charge of another person "whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others
if not controlled" has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the person "from doing such harm."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2
(West 2020) ("Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury
resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the
discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.").
Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (Wash. 1992) ("When a parolee's criminal history and
255.
progress during parole show that the parolee is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled,
the parole officer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the parolee and to prevent him
or her from doing such harm.").
614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
256.
257.
In Thompson, a local government released a young person committed to a juvenile facility
after he had allegedly expressed an intention to kill someone, and later murdered a child. Id. at 730.

258.

Id. at 736.
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and issue certificates of relief. These markers of redemption can encourage courts
to balance the labor redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims.
This is shown in negligent hiring claims in which courts consider evidence that the
state found the individual to be rehabilitated. In O'Connorv. Corbett Lumber Corp.,259
a North Carolina appeals court found that employers have no duty to protect
customers from the criminal acts of work release inmates. As the court explained,
no independent employer duty to inquire was necessary where the state "approved
and recommended [the employee] for work release," the employee "was
psychologically tested and cleared as posing no danger to society," and the state
instructed employers "to treat work release inmates the same as they treat
260
non-inmate employees with respect to the duties given to them."
Thompson and O'Connor suggest that state-issued markers of rehabilitation can
effectively balance the dignity and safety interests in negligent tort claims. Six states
establish a presumption that employers who knowingly hire people with state-issued
2 61
New York case law
markers of redemption satisfy their duty of care
demonstrates how state-issued certificates of relief can encourage courts in these
262
New York
states to meaningfully balance redemption and security interests.
provides certificates of relief, which create a rebuttable presumption of
rehabilitation, and require that employers demonstrate a direct relationship between
263
the conviction and the position sought to justify a denial. But the case law in these
instances do not always favor the applicant, particularly those seeking positions that
require direct contact with vulnerable people, such as children in schools. In Boone
v. New York City Department of Education,264 for example, a trial court rejected a
school's determination that a petit larceny conviction suggested a direct risk of
stealing confidential information from students as a school bus attendant. In Boone,
the applicant had a certificate of relief and the conviction did not involve theft of
confidential information. 265 But the New York Court of Appeals, in contrast,
upheld the same agency's determination not to hire an individual as a school bus
266
driver in In re Dempsey v. New York City Department of Education. In that case, the
applicant had five convictions, two of which were drug-related felonies, for which
the applicant received certificates of relief from the state.267 The court, nonetheless,

259.

352 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).

260.
Id. at 273.
261.
Those states are Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-54 (2019); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-5.5-25 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-173.5 (West 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.25(g)(2) (West 2020); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 40-29-107(n)(1) (2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.492 (West 2020).
See, e.g., Boone v N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 38 N.Y.S.3d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016).
262.
263.
Id.
264.
Id.
Id at 721.
265.
33 N.E.3d 485 (N.Y. 2015).
266.
267. Id. at 491-92.
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held that the agency appropriately rejected the candidate because the convictions
directly related to the risk of distributing controlled substances to students. 268
This analysis suggests that courts can more meaningfully balance the
redemption and security interests in a negligent hiring claim in states that provide
access to markers of rehabilitation. State-provided bonding and insurance programs
can additionally shift the costs of hiring individuals with markers of risk to the state
by compensating injured plaintiffs. Labor redemption may also be used defensively
by the state, relying on the reasoning in Thompson, to avoid liability for unforeseeable
harm caused by expansion of reentry programs.
The aim of this Part is not to describe all possible applications of labor
redemption but to show its broad doctrinal significance. Practitioners,
administrative agencies, courts, and states may elaborate on labor redemption as a
right and interest. Practitioners may challenge state re-incarceration for failure to
find work, and arbitrary denials of occupational licenses and public employment, as
deprivations of due process, and assert the significance of certificates of relief in
Title VII and negligent hiring suits. Courts and the EEOC can broadly consider
comparator and statistical evidence and reject employer business necessity defenses
that do not account for state-issued markers of redemption. Courts considering
negligent hiring claims can infer that an applicant with a certificate of relief is
rehabilitated. Generally, states recognizing labor redemption in reentry policies can
require that post-release work requirements have a rehabilitative purpose 269 and that
occupational license restrictions consider the applicant's rehabilitation. 270
Labor redemption can also guide future law reform, as I argue in the
next Part.
IV. LABOR REDEMPTION AS GUIDE FOR LAW REFORM

Labor redemption as an interest and a right can guide future law reform. Labor
redemption, specifically, justifies automatically expunging and sealing criminal
records or granting certificates of relief, after the period in which the criminal
records suggest no greater risk than the general population. It would, likewise, justify
a process for recently released individuals to obtain markers of redemption to signal
desistance to employers. These reforms have normative implications for other areas,

268.

Id.

New York requires that conditions of post-release supervision must have a rehabilitative
269.
purpose. See People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. 1995) ("The punitive and deterrent
nature" of requiring an individual convicted of driving while intoxicated to affix "CONVICTED DWI"
to his license plate as a term of probation "overshadow[ed] any possible rehabilitative potential" of the
probationary conditions.); People v. McNair, 665 N.E.2d 167, 171 (N.Y. 1996) ("The general rule to be
drawn from Letterlough is that a court may not create its own probationary condition which is
predominantly punitive in the sense that its punitive elements overshadow its rehabilitative
components.").
270.
New York State requires its occupational licenses and public and private employers to
753
(g)
consider the applicant's rehabilitation, among other factors. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW §
(McKinney 2019).
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especially housing discrimination, in which private decision makers exclude
candidates because of state-imposed stigmas.

A. Automating Sealing, Expungement, and Certificationsof Relief
Despite state expansion of sealing, expungement, and certificates of relief,
expanding their reach will require further legislative change. There is no
constitutional right to sealing and expungement. States have been found to violate
27
the due process rights of arrestees for public shaming, 1 but the same protections
do not apply to individuals who have been convicted of a crime. Constitutional
challenges to the public availability of criminal records are further limited by the
state action requirement.272 Criminal records are not typically published to
employers by the state, but rather by credit reporting agencies (CRAs), which are
private actors. While the state does make criminal records publicly available to
273
CRAs, state action exceptions are narrowly construed by the Supreme Court, and
274
CRAs are unlikely to be considered agents of the state.
Yet, as explained in Section II.A, people with criminal records have a
significant dignity interest in mechanisms to remove criminal records from use by
employers. This interest should prevail for criminal records that do not suggest a
significantly heightened risk for employers. Expungement and certificates of relief,
275
moreover, are attractive subjects of legislative reform, particularly if automated,
because they are effective, do not increase workplace risk, and are virtually costless.
Recent empirical evidence strongly supports the claim that disrupting unnecessary
stigmas has a positive effect on employment. J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr examined
expungement practices in Michigan, finding that recipients were thirteen percent

See Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that sheriff's use
271.
of webcam to post video of pre-trial arrestees "being photographed, fingerprinted, and booked" on the
internet without legitimate public interest violated due process); see also Bursac v. Suozzi, 868 N.Y.S.2d
470, 481 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that the state's "actions, in publishing and maintaining the petitioner's
name, picture and identifying information embedded in a press release on the County's Internet Web
site, which results in limitless and eternal notoriety, without any controls," supplies the additional harm
that satisfies the stigma-plus standard).
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982).
272.
273.
A CRA's conduct satisfies this requirement only if it fulfills a public function, or if the
state's involvement with the CRA is so entangled that the private actor's conduct is no longer private.
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365
U.S. 715, 716, 721-22 (1961).
274.
Government contractors and public utilities generally do not meet this standard.
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-41; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999).
275.
While many states permit individuals to petition for expungement, they can be
administratively complex and burdensome for petitioners. Few eligible individuals are aware of
petition-based expungement, and those who are rarely use it. See Colleen V. Chien, The Second Chance
Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265335 [https://perma.cc/8J62-PUR2] (finding in empirical analysis that
only about three percent of eligible individuals obtain expungement in petition-based jurisdictions).
Few individuals, similarly, receive petition-based certificates of rehabilitation. New York State, the first
state to offer these markers of redemption, "grants only about 3,000 of them per year." Elmore, supra
note 158, at 1013.
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more likely to be hired and that their wages increased around twenty-five percent. 276
These findings are consistent with those of Peter Leasure and Tia Stevens
Andersen, who assessed the effectiveness of certificates of relief issued in Ohio.
Professors Leasure and Andersen found that a certificate of relief effectively erased
the stigma of the criminal record.277 While fewer than ten percent of applicants who
reported a conviction without a certificate of relief received a callback, over
twenty-five percent of those who reported a conviction with a certificate of relief
278
did, nearly as high as those who reported no conviction at all.
Nor would sealing, expungement, and issuing certificates of rehabilitation
necessarily increase workplace risk. Professors Prescott and Starr found that
individuals whose records were expunged in Michigan "pose a lower crime risk than
the general population of Michigan as a whole." 279 The likelihood of a person
convicted of a violent crime committing a future violent crime is very low,
particularly older individuals who have been incarcerated for a period of time. 280
This suggests that widespread adoption of labor redemption reforms by automating
markers of redemption would significantly improve the employment outcomes of
people with a criminal record without increasing workplace risk.281
To be sure, the effectiveness of automating sealing, expungement, and
certifications of relief will depend on how employers respond. Employers may react
to automated sealing and expungement of criminal records and certifications of
relief by engaging in statistical discrimination against African Americans or by
searching for negative credentials on the Internet. These concerns merit further
study. But as Prescott and Starr explain, automating markers of redemption seems
likely to reduce these risks, especially compared with Ban the Box measures
forbidding all criminal record inquiries. Current measures automating the sealing
and expungement of criminal records and certificates of relief target only old or
minor criminal records. To the extent that employers will continue to have access
to criminal records that signal a bona fide risk, it is unclear why sealing and
expunging old and minor records would increase statistical discrimination. 282 And
while it is possible that employers will obtain negative credentials on the Internet,
this has not emerged as a significant problem in the states that have automatic
sealing and expungement policies. 283 This may be because most employers use

276.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2527-32, 2551.
Leasure & Andersen, supra note 62.
277.
278. Id. at 19-20 n.44.
279.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 9259, at 2514.
280.
Id. at 2513-16.
281.
Id. at 2518 (concluding that automatic sealing and expungement provisions "with
comparable requirements and waiting periods [as Michigan] are unlikely to deny [employers] access to
information that they need to protect themselves or their employees," or customers).
282.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 9259, at 2548-50.
Id. at 2541-42. Some scholars have expressed concern that the private availability of
283.
criminal record histories makes reducing access through official channels futile. JACOBS, supra note 49,
at 120-21.
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CRAs to conduct background checks, which are required to retire sealed and
284
expunged records from their databases by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The
availability of certificates of relief should also resolve any concern about the First
285
since
Amendment implications of restricting access to criminal records,
certificates of relief can be used for any record that would otherwise require
286
disclosure under freedom of information laws.
Sealing, expungement, certificates of relief, and removal of occupational
license restrictions for criminal records that suggest no future risk are cost
effective. 287 The administrative costs and uncertainty of risk assessments can be
minimized by reference to general statistics instead of engaging in individualized
determinations. Criminologists Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura propose
a general risk assessment of individuals with criminal records, which they call
"redemption studies," by comparing their criminal record history with arrest
frequencies in the general population. 288 Professors Blumstein and Nakamura have
found that individuals with one to two convictions stand no greater risk of an arrest
than the general population after five years without an arrest, and thirteen years for
individuals with six to ten convictions. 289 Professors Prescott and Starr, after
reviewing Blumstein and Nakamura's and other extant redemption studies,
conclude that they reflect a redemption period "usually in the range of four to ten
years." 290 Redemption may occur earlier for some offenses and for
291
older individuals.
As with Michigan and Pennsylvania, states can protect the societal interest in
labor redemption without incurring significant administrative costs by removing

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681c (2012); see Elmore, supra note 158, at 1013.
284.
285.
See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 176-79 (concluding that the First Amendment right to public
access to criminal records "remains unresolved"); Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77
MD. L. REv. 337, 372-74 (2018) (arguing that "as long as the United States treats criminal history
records as public records, regulating the use of these records will be unconstitutional").
286.
The First Amendment prohibits limiting disclosure of information already released to the
public, and access to open court records. The state may, however, restrict access to validly sealed records
and some underlying information retained by law enforcement agencies. The Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) permits law enforcement to withhold disclosure of information that would constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). While restricting access to
irrelevant records burdens the First Amendment right to disclosure, FOIA exempts from disclosure
government records about private citizens that can "reasonably be expected to invade that citizen's
privacy," including contents of a rap sheet and mug shots. U.S. Dep't of Just. v. Reporters Comm. for
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 777 n.22 (1989) (rap sheet); Times Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. U.S. Dep't
of Just., 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 479 (E.D. La. 1999) (mug shot).
287.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2551-52 (finding that expungement "compares very
favorably to job training in terms of both effectiveness and cost-effectiveness").
BLUMSTEIN & NAKAMURA, supranote 34.
288.
Id. at 22.
289.
Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2519.
290.
291.
A follow-up study by Prescott, Starr, and Pyle found that redemption occurs earlier for
older individuals, and that people convicted of violent offenses, who are often left out of expungement
policies, are the least likely to recidivate among people who are incarcerated. Prescott et al., supra note
220, at 1688, 1696-97.
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state-imposed work barriers within a similar timeline, or earlier upon completion of
a reentry program that demonstrates rehabilitation.
B. Ease Availability of Other Markers of Rehabilitationfor the Recently Incarcerated
While automating markers of redemption can improve labor market outcomes
for people with old or minor records, sealing, expungement, and certificates of
rehabilitation are often unavailable for people with recent, serious criminal
convictions. The dignity interest in removal of collateral consequences for these
individuals can be outweighed by the security interests of employers, employees,
and consumers, since recent, serious criminal convictions can suggest future risk.
Employer aversions can even be necessary in workplaces with vulnerable employees
and consumers. Instead, the dignity interests of these individuals can be effectively
addressed through reentry programming, such as drug treatment and work
programs, that can demonstrate rehabilitation. Work programs, for example, can
certify the candidate's performance history and provide access to employer
references. These markers of rehabilitation can overcome employer aversions to
even significant criminal record histories. 292 In contrast to sealing and expunging
old or minor convictions, however, these markers can impose large costs on the
state, requiring further justification.
That justification lies in the state duty to provide markers of redemption that
are necessary for recently released individuals to comply with work mandates and
to pay penalties and fees in order to avoid re-incarceration. These individuals have
a significant dignity interest in markers necessary to comply with these state
mandates, which would demonstrate their rehabilitation to employers. In addition
to addressing the perversity of state mandates that individuals cannot comply with,
labor redemption for this group also advances important societal interests.
Criminologists insist on the public value of reintegration of this group. 293
Recidivism rates are highest for people with multiple convictions and in the year
after incarceration. 294 Steady, meaningful work is most likely to have a desistance
effect for this group. Shifting the costs of reintegration of recently incarcerated
individuals onto private employers, moreover, is implausible. Employers often may
(in some cases, must) lawfully discriminate against recently incarcerated individuals.
The state assignment to find and keep work as a condition of supervised
release to avoid re-incarceration implies an affirmative duty of reintegration on the
state beyond removal of arbitrary barriers. Labor redemption for these individuals
requires attending to drivers of chronic unemployment among people with criminal
records, especially the lack of education and job skills, and high rates of substance
abuse and mental illness. State requirements that the recently incarcerated find and

292.
See, e.g., Megan Denver, CriminalRecords, Positive Credentials and Recidivism: Incorporating
Evidence of Rehabilitation into Criminal Background Check Employment Decisions, 66 CRIME
& DEINQ. 194, 211-12 (2020).
293.
See, e.g., BLUMSTEIN & NAKAMURA, supra note 34.
294. Prisoners and PrisonerRe-E nty, supra note 28.
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keep work imply a duty to provide a process by which recently incarcerated
individuals can obtain markers to demonstrate their rehabilitation to employers.
C. Expand Redemption Beyond Work Izw: The HousingAnalogy
Labor redemption has implications beyond work law, to other areas, especially
housing discrimination, in which private decision makers have an aversion to
unnecessary, state-imposed stigmas. In these cases, the expanding use of criminal
background checks is most effectively addressed by shifting attention to the state
and its imposition of arbitrary barriers that private decision makers rely on to make
overbroad, but legally defensible, exclusions.
Housing is the closest parallel to the legal protections available to, and roles of
the state and private actors in the employment of, people with criminal records.
Like employment, housing is necessary for successful reintegration into society.
Successful transition from prison to affordable housing improves welfare and
5
reduces recidivism. 29 But private landlords have a strong aversion to people with
criminal records and often will not lease an apartment to individuals with a criminal
record history. Many local governments restrict public housing based on criminal
record history. 296 Thousands of cities have additionally enacted "crime free"
neighborhood ordinances that encourage landlords to conduct background checks
297
Overbroad
and refuse leases to individuals with a criminal record history.
background checks by private landlords, encouraged by local government, deepen
and racialize housing segregation with a "prison to homelessness" pipeline that
298
disparately impacts African American and Latinx communities.
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), like Title VII, prohibits housing discrimination
by private landlords. While people with criminal records are not a protected class
under the FHA, it does permit challenges to overbroad landlord background checks
299
The United States Department of Housing
based on a disparate impact theory.
and Urban Development (HUD) in 2016 issued guidance that overbroad
background checks can have an unlawful "discriminatory effect" on race and
national origin. 300 But FHA disparate impact analysis suffers from the same
structural limitations as Title VII. Prior to October 26, 2020, landlords could defeat

Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks, Race, and
295.
DisparateImpact, 93 IND. L.J. 421, 432-33 (2018).

296.
297.

Id. at 450-51.
Id.

Id. at 434; Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of
298.
Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 193-95 (2019). On the impact of private
landlord discrimination on residential racial segregation and plausible systemic legal challenges to it, see
Anthony V. Alfieri, Black, Poor, and Gone: Civil Rights Law's Inner-City Crisis, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.

REv. 629, 666-67 (2019).
The Supreme Court in 2015 upheld the availability of disparate impact challenges under
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the FlHA in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,

576 U.S. 519 (2015).
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a disparate impact challenge by showing that a background check is "necessary to
achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest." 30 1 This standard is
"essentially equivalent" 302 to the Title VII business justification defense, prohibiting
broad exclusion of a prospective tenant based on arrest records or "bald assertions,"
while permitting landlords to conduct facially reasonable background checks. 303
HUD replaced this standard with a new rule, effective October 26, 2020, loosening
the business justification requirement to merely require the landlord to show that
the background check "advances a valid interest (or interests) and is therefore not
arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary."304
As Valerie Schneider and Deborah Archer separately propose, overbroad
private landlord exclusions and municipal "crime free" ordinances raise plausible
FHA disparate impact challenges. 30S But, whether HUD's new rule remains in place
or HUD reverts to the previous rule, it is uncertain how these challenges will fare
against the landlord business necessity defense. It seems likely that a court would
express similar skepticism to background check challenges under the FHA as the
Third Circuit expressed in El to that Title VII challenge. Courts following Elwould
permit exclusion of candidates whose criminal record indicates a heightened risk,
especially in dwellings that include vulnerable tenants and in which the candidate
cannot demonstrate rehabilitation. As in employment, absent evidence of candidate
rehabilitation, these checks appear likely to survive FHA challenge, and privacy
protections such as Ban the Box would delay, but not deter, overbroad checks. 306
My assessment that state-issued markers of redemption can resolve structural

limitations to Title VII applies to the close parallel of housing discrimination against
people with criminal records. Second-chance reforms can reduce the effect of
landlord aversions to criminal records by removing old and minor criminal records
from consideration and expanding access to certificates of relief, transitional
housing, and references from previous landlords. These markers of rehabilitation
can cast doubt on the landlord's business justification defense in FHA disparate
impact challenges. Tax incentives, bonding, and insurance can further reduce the
private landlord aversion by shifting the costs of reintegration to the state.

301.
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§100.500(c)(2).
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A landlord may defeat a prima facie FHA disparate impact claim by showing a business
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4-5 (2016), https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hud
pdf [https://perma.cc/UP28-D5CU].
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Archer, supra note 298, at 223-31; Schneider, supra note 295, at 451-52.
This analysis is aligned with Professor Schneider's call for judicial attention to mitigating
306.
evidence of rehabilitation by tenants and for expansion of Ban the Box laws to landlords. Schneider,
supra note 295, at 451-52. As indicated in El, the difficulty lies in the lack of available evidence of
rehabilitation that courts may rely on in making this determination.
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In conclusion, labor redemption offers a conceptual framework to guide
second-chance reforms to strengthen the employment protections of people with
criminal records. Reentry reforms, in particular, should focus on expanding the
removal of state-imposed barriers to work and increasing access to rehabilitation
programming that offers markers of redemption for people with recent criminal
convictions. Expansion of these reforms will strengthen existing employment law
protections, without imposing legal obligations on private employers and the need
to amend employment laws. Reconceiving employment rights as a state obligation
to remove unnecessary barriers has implications beyond employment, especially in
housing discrimination law, in which private decision makers exclude candidates
because of an aversion to arbitrary state-imposed barriers.
CONCLUSION: LABOR REDEMPTION AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO BARRIERS TO
WORK CREATED BY MASS INCARCERATION

This Article argues that improving reentry outcomes in employment will
require disrupting the stigma of a criminal record and other unnecessary
state-imposed barriers to work. Second-chance reforms of sealing, expungement,
certificates of relief, and financial incentives to hire strengthen and shape existing
employment protections for people with criminal records, without the need to
amend existing employment law. This new body of work law responds to the era of
mass incarceration by recognizing the dignity interest and rights of workers who
labor in the shadow of the carceral state.
While labor redemption is an important, emerging area with implications
beyond work law, a caveat is in order: it is an incomplete vision of reentry policy.
Redemption premised on the opportunity to seek work in the formal economy has

little value to individuals working in secondary labor markets because of race, sex,
class, and other stigmas. It has no value at all to the many individuals in the carceral
307
state who cannot work because of a disability.
Successful reintegration into society requires state attention to a complicated
web of social problems inadequately addressed after the demise of welfare as a
meaningful safety net and magnified by tough-on-crime criminal justice policies.
The criminal justice system has not yet come to grips with, and has indeed
contributed to, the high rates of substance abuse and mental illness, lack of
education and job skills, and chronic unemployment in poor communities. State
and local governments continue to allocate scarce resources to policing and
incarceration while starving social programs better equipped to attend to these
drivers of violence and social disorder. 308 These problems place insurmountable

One-quarter of Professor Western's sample of individuals released from state prison were
307.
jobless during the entire year after leaving prison. WESTERN, supranote 36, at 97-98. Professor Western
reports that many of these individuals live with chronic pain, serious mental illness and a drug addition,
so "cannot work and face the deepest poverty as a result." Id. at 98.
Amna Akbar, Toward a RadicalImaginationof Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 451-52 (2018)
308.
("Policing and imprisonment become 'catch all' responses to social problems like homelessness, mental
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burdens on people leaving incarceration and continue the cycle of incarceration for
many. Attending to these problems will require a broader national commitment to
reintegration and to reinvesting in communities where people with criminal records
come from, and where they return to. 309
The role of labor redemption in promoting reintegration through work
described here should be understood as fitting within this larger project. The racism
and structural violence of the criminal justice system require disrupting the stigma
of a criminal record for employers. A discouraging number of people after
incarceration remain jobless, particularly members of racial minorities. Current
equality and privacy protections undermine reentry policy because they do not
attend to the role of the state in the problem; instead, they impose costs on
employers that they are resistant to accept and that courts are reluctant to impose.
This Article turns attention to the state and proposes labor redemption as a dignity
interest that flows from the state assignment of the responsibility to the individual
to reintegrate into society through work. Labor redemption entitles these individuals
to protection from unnecessary interference with that responsibility. This Article
proposes labor redemption as a conceptual framework to dismantle unnecessary
barriers to reintegration through work and to advance the rehabilitative goals of
reentry policy.

health crises, drug use, and unemployment, from which the state has otherwise disinvested.");
WESTERN, supra note 36, at 188 ("Under the harsh conditions of American poverty, the antidote to
violence is not more punishment but restoring the institutions, social bonds, and well-being that enable
order and predictability in daily life.").
309.
See WESTERN, supra note 36, at 182-84 (assessing that the "thick public safety" of "families,
work, and other social supports" gives people released from prison not only physical security, but
security "in their housing, intimate relationships, and livelihoods," but that these social supports depend
on public supports, including transitional support for individuals the year after release, continuity of
medical and mental health care, and secure housing).
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